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ABSTRACT 
Sex equality—a signifcant contribution to the international human rights 
canon—was one of the legitimating principles of socialist states in Eastern Eu-
rope and, at least formally, of their post-socialist democratic successors. Why
then has the subject been ignored or deeply marginalized in post-socialist 
legal education? Using socio-legal analysis to establish a legitimation or 
delegitimation dynamic regarding law in theory and practice in both eras, 
the author provides answers to this question and suggests various options 
for reforming post-socialist legal education to provide adequate training 
in the subject of women’s rights consistent with states’ international and 
regional human rights obligations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe signaled the end of 
an almost ffty year Cold War pitting socialism’s twentieth century rush to 
modernization1 through the “victory of the proletariat” against capitalist liberal
democracy. As socialism was being consigned to the trash heap of history in 
the region’s2 transition to liberal democracy,3 there were optimistic expec-
1. IVAN T. BEREND, DECADES OF CRISIS: CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE BEFORE WORLD WAR II, 1 (1998). 
2. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. See MARK MORJÉ HOWARD, THE WEAKNESS OF
CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 147 (2003), for empirical analyses of “differences 
of degree” rather than “differences in kind.” 
3. Jacqui True, Gendering Post-Socialist Transitions, in GENDER AND GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING: 
SIGHTINGS, SITES AND RESISTANCES 74–75 (Marianne H. Marchand & Anne Sisson Runyan eds., 
2000). 
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tations that imported Western values, norms, practices, and institutions—a 
market economy, a free democratic electoral system, constitutionalism, a civil
law system encompassing an expanding European and international human 
rights canon, and a rule of law—would transform ex-socialist states. In that 
process, socialism’s authoritarian legacies would dissipate or be discarded. 
But not all socialist ideals were consigned to that scrap heap. Sex equal-
ity—one of socialism’s signature ideological legitimating principles—was 
carried over in socialism’s market-oriented successors as a constitutional 
principle and fundamental guarantee of citizenship.4 Yet for almost two and 
a half decades, the predominant political, legal, cultural, and educational 
responses of post-socialist states to sex equality issues—now part of the 
international human rights canon—have been marginalization, devaluation, 
resistance, or avoidance. 
I start from the proposition that these patterns are neither idiosyncratic, 
nor a matter of casual neglect or mere oversight; they cannot be simply ex-
plained by a facile assertion that post-socialist states have had to deal with 
allegedly more important political and economic issues in the longer term 
wake of socialism’s collapse. Rather, they are evidence of what I characterize
as legitimation/delegitimation contestations that usually pit NGOs—com-
mitted to the legitimation of women’s rights through state compliance with 
constitutional as well as regional and international human rights obliga-
tions—against powerful conservative and neo-liberal forces committed to 
the delegitimation of those rights. 
This article addresses one largely overlooked arena of that legitimation/ 
delegitimation contestation: legal education, largely in high status state-
funded law faculties that dominate the feld in each post-socialist country. 
Like other education, legal education is a “socially facilitated process of 
cultural transmission.”5 More specifcally, as the major frst step in the pro-
fessional socialization process of future lawyers and legal system offcials, it 
is also a process of consciousness molding. Not only does it convey formal 
knowledge and a method of reasoning and analysis, it upholds a system of 
values through its choices of curriculum content, pedagogy, and structure. 
The inclusion or absence of a subject may be said to signify its importance 
or its lack thereof to the legal system, the larger society, and the state. In 
turn, this choice has longer term consequences for the practice of law and 
the operation of a legal system and, thus, contributes to the legitimation/ 
delegitimation contestations I discuss in this article. 
4. “Citizenship can give rise to legal entitlements; it can serve as a source of security and 
stability and even a type of dignity . . . the recognition of a person’s capacity to be 
part of the public sphere and to take part in public discussions that shape the course 
of one’s life.” HELEN IRVING, GENDER AND THE CONSTITUTION: EQUITY AND AGENCY IN COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 90 (2008). 
5. PHILIP W. JACKSON, WHAT IS EDUCATION? 9 (2012) (emphasis removed). 
Vol. 36510 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
      
The socio-legal context in which these contestations are occurring is 
crucial and, in important ways, distinguishes post-socialist states from their 
sister states to the West. Weakly legitimated post-socialist legal systems are 
still grappling with the longer term legacies of deeply delegitimated socialist 
law and legal systems. In the twenty-frst century the diffculties created by 
those legacies are compounded by the complexities of an avalanche of law 
reforms driven by the European Union and pressures upon post-socialist 
states and legal systems both to comply with European principles of consti-
tutionalism and to demonstrate that they have taken steps to anchor a rule 
of law consciousness in their respective states. Though women’s rights are 
part of the human rights canon and, thus, a component of that rule of law, 
courts are unwilling to uphold them when the court’s actions are interpreted 
as challenges to parliamentary-based popular sovereignty. 
Some readers may object to my analysis being confned to states in one 
part of Europe—as if these states are singled out for hyper-critical scrutiny. 
However, there are signifcant differences within Europe in history, politics, 
and culture, as well as in the substance of law and the operation of legal 
systems and, for decades, the content and control over legal education. It 
would be rather sloppy scholarship to start from the proposition that if, in 
almost all Eastern European law faculties and in a number of Western ones 
as well, women’s rights are marginalized or excluded, there simply is one 
general reductionist explanation—fraternal patriarchy.6 Such fattening suf-
fers from a lack of context. More specifcally, it overlooks the fact that sex 
equality played a different role in a continent once divided by the Cold War 
and that the legacies of socialism are important for understanding legitima-
tion/delegitimation struggles regarding women’s rights in its post-Cold War 
eastern portion. 
Other readers may be troubled by the scope of this article’s analy-
sis, which ignores each post-socialist country’s uniqueness and, thus, the 
specifcities of the context in which the contestations are embedded. Yet 
the consistency among states is so striking that it warrants an explanation. 
Still others may claim that this analysis is premature—that the interval 
of almost two and a half decades since the collapse of socialism is a short 
one for reform in educational institutions. However, the extent and pace of 
law faculties’ curricular responses to post-socialist market economy impera-
tives within the same interval suggests that the pace of reform can be—and 
has been—accelerated. 
6. See generally SYLVIA WALBY, THEORIZING PATRIARCHY (1990). Unlike traditional patriarchy, 
a male dominated hierarchical arrangement within families, clans, and closely allied 
communities, fraternal patriarchy operates in larger social units in which men bond to 
maintain power and control over women without having close ties based on blood or 
marriage. 
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In this article, I discuss the reasons that the canon of women’s rights, 
which directly concerns half of a state’s population and has a profound 
impact on its other half, has been largely ignored in the law curriculum. I 
then identify the ways in which this defciency can be remedied. It is my 
hope that the concerns I raise will become part of a professional discus-
sion on the full inclusion of women’s rights in the law faculty curriculum 
of post-socialist states. 
A. Raising the Question: A Professional/Personal Odyssey 
In the early 1990s, as I began to have access to the region7 as a legal aca-
demic, lawyer, and human rights activist, I became aware that nothing I had 
previously studied fully prepared me for the enormous changes generated 
by post-socialist modernization efforts oriented toward democratic European
statehood and, in many ways, the early exhilaration generated by this pros-
pect. That said, there were also developments that warranted apprehension: 
the lack of discussion concerning the longer term cultural engineering en-
tailed in changing popular and offcial consciousness and practices regarding
law and legal systems generated by socialism; the selective incorporation 
of certain human rights into post-socialist law and legal practice and the 
disregard of others; the failure of post-socialist governments, despite pressure
from independent women’s rights NGOs, to pay attention to women’s rights; 
the resurgence of political and cultural forces that openly challenged the 
legitimacy of some important human rights principles, including women’s 
rights; and what appeared to be a torpid pace of reform to a stultifying prior 
system of socialist legal education. 
When I frst raised the absence of women’s rights in the law curriculum 
as a substantive issue with my mostly male legal academic colleagues in the 
region, they usually responded with a range of polite dismissals. Women 
were already men’s equals. Women were already discussed unavoidably in 
certain subjects such as criminal or family law. Moreover, most women’s 
issues were matters of culture and, thus, not of law. 
Frequently, there were awkward moments when they embellished their 
comments with sexualized jokes and proverbs that invoked humiliating ste-
reotypes of women, framed as timeless, self-evident, and culturally validated
wisdom. I, not surprisingly, refused to be complicit in my own humiliation 
by performing the appropriate social response of laughing appreciatively or 
nodding knowingly. At the same time, I knew that a direct open challenge 
7. I have taught in law, social work, journalism, and sociology faculties and worked with 
NGOs in Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Kosovo, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, and Slovakia. 




    
    
to their remarks on my part would only confrm prevailing demonizing 
caricatures of feminists, especially American ones. 
In that frst decade, most law students displayed degrees of wariness, 
skepticism, or polite disinterest when I raised issues of women’s rights, perhaps
because they took their cues from their teachers and peers. A few honest 
young women, however, confded that they were silenced, ridiculed, and 
humiliated by students and professors when they tried to raise such issues 
inside or outside the classroom. 
As I continued to work in the region during the frst decade of the 
twenty-frst century, it was apparent that there was a lack of political will to 
follow up with necessary specifc implementing legislation or the develop-
ment of adequate monitoring mechanisms, despite post-socialist states’ de 
jure commitments to sex equality, displayed by a constitutional provision 
or the enactment of an anti-discrimination law. Women’s rights were not a 
concern of academic jurists. Among law students, however, I did fnd that a 
modest number, overwhelmingly female, were aware of domestic violence 
as a women’s rights issue. That their consciousness was the result of NGO 
campaigns on the subject, rather than a product of their legal education, 
was clear—as students often displayed a telling lack of knowledge of the 
overarching women’s rights jurisprudential framework in which the issue of 
violence against women is embedded. 
Fast forward to the time of writing this article. Many law faculties now 
offer a general or European human rights course.8 That said, based on my 
contacts and ongoing experience in the region as well as the data from four 
brief surveys I have conducted on the content of their legal education dur-
ing the past eight years among more than eighty recently graduated lawyers 
from post-socialist states,9 there is consistent evidence that women’s rights 
are either not discussed or are mentioned only cursorily in any human 
rights course and very rarely, if ever, integrated or mainstreamed into more 
traditional law school subjects. 
B.  Formulating an Answer 
Several contemporary, scholarly, interdisciplinary approaches to law—law 
and culture studies, socio-legal analysis, and feminist legal theory and prac-
tice—inform my substantive development of a framework for this article: a 
three-pronged nexus consisting of culture, politics, law and the legal system, 
8. I am indebted to my former research assistants Vera Cedano, Sara Korol, Amber Przybysz,
and Stephanie Forman, for a review of law faculty web pages. (On fle with the author.) 
9. See Appendix A. These respondents participated in the pioneering program of the 
Women’s Human Rights Training Institute in Sofa, Bulgaria. 
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and legal education. Section II is devoted to the frst prong, and Sections III 
and IV are devoted to the second and third prongs. The advantage of this 
nexus is that it allows me to digest and synthesize relevant historical and 
contemporary information—admittedly a navigation between the Scylla of 
too much and the Charybdis of too little—that is essential to understanding 
the concerns raised in this article regarding the content of the law curriculum
and its consequences. 
Scholarly endeavors in the feld of law and culture offer rich insights 
into the constitutive relationship between them. Culture is connected with 
the diverse ways in which social groups construct their lives ideologically, 
including what people think, value, believe, and hold as ideals. Culture plays
an important role in the construction of identity.10 Culture also contributes 
to the shaping of a legal system,11 the substance of law, and the form and 
content of lawyers’ and legal system offcials’ education. In turn, law, the 
legal system, and legal education infuence the ongoing reshaping of a 
culture12 by delineating hegemonic13 social identity categories as legal clas-
sifcations, including those based on sex and gender. Law assists in imposing 
and enforcing such social identity categories and, thereby, contributes to 
shaping an environment and a culture.14 
Socio-legal analysis, the second approach, interprets law systematically 
and empirically as a social phenomenon.15 It looks behind ideology, rheto-
ric, and formal approaches to the study of law, to the meaning of law in 
society as doctrine, interpretation, reason, and argument.16 It also looks to 
the processes of legitimation17 or delegitimation of law that support culture, 
as well as to the legal systems that enforce culture. 
Contemporary socio-legal analysis distinguishes legitimation’s normative
justifcation of the authoritativeness of political and legal orders from its 
10. RIKKI HOLTMAAT & JONNEKE NABER, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND CULTURE: FROM DEADLOCK TO
DIALOGUE 52–53 (2011). 
11. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legal Cultures of Europe, 30 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 55, 57 (1996). 
12. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition: Overcoming Displacement and Reifcation in 
Cultural Politics, in RECOGNITION STRUGGLES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: CONTESTED IDENTITIES, AGENCY
AND POWER 21(Barbara Hobson ed., 2003). 
13. Hegemony refers to power that naturalizes a social order, an institution, or even everyday
practice so that how things are seems inevitable, and not the consequence of particular 
historical actors, classes, and events. Susan F. Hirsch & Mindie Lazarus-Black, Introduc-
tion, in CONTESTED STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY, AND RESISTANCE 7 (Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan 
F. Hirsch eds., 1994). 
14. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973). 
15. Roger Cotterrell, Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?, 25 J. L. & SOC’Y
171, 183 (1998). 
16. ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY: LEGAL IDEAS IN THE MIRROR OF SOCIAL THEORY 45–63 
(2006). 
17. See generally RODNEY BARKER, LEGITIMATING IDENTITIES: THE SELF-PRESENTATIONS OF RULERS AND SUBJECTS
(2001). 







        
  
 
        
 
    
  
     
   
          
   
 
     
         
empirical aspects at three levels. Most abstract is polity legitimacy, consisting
of the overall support and a sense of common attachment often expressed in 
historical narratives. It provides a legal system with normative coherence. Of
greater importance for this article are the two other levels—regime legitimacy
and output legitimacy. The former concerns issues of law and order; the latter
focuses on a state’s capacity to produce effective and effcient performance 
in accordance with criteria beyond purely economic considerations that are 
important to a particular political community.18 
Feminist legal theory is the third approach addressed in this article’s 
analysis. It underscores the signifcance and infuence of sex and gen-
der19—socially constructed categories underpinning sex/gender systems20 
and ideologies—which consist of roles, symbols, and meanings as well as 
rules, privileges, and punishments—that order behaviors, especially those 
connected with the exercise of power and sexuality.21 One of its most sig-
nifcant contributions is the recognition that law, often relying on sex/gender 
stereotypes,22 plays an important role as an enforcement mechanism in the 
acquisition, maintenance, and reproduction of sex and gender in both the 
public and private spheres23 of a society and a state. 
Feminist legal scholars rely both on theory and practice to chart the 
commonalities and variations in women’s status in all contexts ranging from 
local norms and practices to the international political, legal, and economic 
system. They focus on the operation and impact of forces, institutions and 
practices in those contexts, which, as components of prevailing gender 
18. See generally LAW AND INFORMAL PRACTICES: THE POST-COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE (Denis Galligan & 
Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003). 
19. “Sexing draws attention to body and nature while gendering emphasizes mind and cul-
ture.” In gendering, law plays a constitutive role in forming the ‘naturally’ sexed person 
based on culture specifc oppositions, such as nature/culture and body/mind. HILARY
CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 4 
(2000). Gender, based on ideas of signifcant aspects of differences (identifed as mas-
culinity and femininity) between the sexes, including different degrees of difference, is 
constitutive of social relationships as an aspect of social differentiation, stratifcation, and
power relations. It is not necessarily a static process. Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful 
Category of Historical Analysis, in WOMEN’S STUDIES INTERNATIONAL: NAIROBI AND BEYOND 26 
(Aruna Rao ed., 1991). 
20. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 45. 
21. Riki Wilchins, A Continuous Nonverbal Communication, in GENDERQUEER: VOICES FROM
BEYOND THE SEXUAL BINARY 11, 14 (Joan Nestle et al. eds., 2002). 
22. REBECCA J. COOK & SIMONE CUSACK, GENDER STEREOTYPING: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45
(2010). 
23. The meaning and signifcance of the public/private distinction in law and culture depends
upon the purpose for which, and the context in which, that distinction is employed.
Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing Women’s 
Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (Dorinda Dollmeyer ed., 
1993). See SUSAN GAL & GAIL KLIGMAN, THE POLITICS OF GENDER AFTER SOCIALISM 37–62 (2000), 
for a reframing of the contents of public and private. 





     
    
        




   
  
 
    
    
  
  




regimes24 within overarching gender orders, disadvantage women and girls 
in sex/gender specifc ways.25 Their theoretical and empirical scholarly work 
identifes and documents the adaptability of the prevailing sex/gender order 
of fraternal patriarchy. That order relies in various ways on male control of 
modes of production in households and families as well as in governance, 
sexuality, cultural institutions, and paid labor. In that overarching order, 
men are the standard,26 regardless of whether women are considered the 
“same” as men, thereby making women invisible, or “different” from men, 
thereby enabling claims of women’s essential inferiority within a sex/gender 
hierarchy,27 or are asymmetrically positioned as a group relative to men.28 
Feminist scholars and lawyers have developed legal theories “to produce
a reasoned critique of current legal arrangements and, in some versions, a 
vision of how law might be constructed in ways that move toward ideals 
of sex equality or gender justice.”29 Theirs is a rapidly expanding canon 
with a shared commitment to the equal worth of women and the universal 
applicability of women’s rights as human rights.30 That canon recognizes 
differences including vulnerabilities and disadvantages31 among women and 
24. The patterning of gender relations within an institution is its gender regime. R. W. CONNELL, 
THE MEN AND THE BOYS 29 (2000). As a regime, gender also involves the way in which the 
state defnes the role of women and men towards the fulfllment of the “common good” 
of a society in that institution. Enikö Magyari-Vincze, Romanian Gender Regimes and 
Women’s Citizenship, in WOMEN AND CITIZENSHIP IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 21 (Jasmina 
Lukić et al. eds., 2006). 
25. NIAMH REILLY, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS: SEEKING GENDER IN A GLOBALIZING AGE 116–18 (2009). 
26. Regardless of whether an individual man meets the patriarchal standard of a hegemonic, 
naturalized, normalized masculinity, all men, by virtue of being men in a fraternal pa-
triarchal order, reap benefts through impersonal institutional supports in the state, the 
economy, and the prevailing culture. CONNELL, supra note 24, at 80–84. R.W. Connell 
& James Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept, 19 GENDER
& SOC’Y 829 (2005). 
Hegemonic masculinities can be constructed that do not correspond closely to the lives of men 
. . . these models . . . express widespread ideals, fantasies and desires. They provide models of 
relations with women and solutions to problems of gender relations . . . and . . . ways of living 
in everyday local circumstances. 
Id. at 838. “To sustain a given pattern of hegemony requires the policing of men as well 
as the exclusion or discrediting of women.” Id. at 844. 
27. See Ivana Radačić, Feminism and Human Rights: The Inclusive Approach to Interpreting 
International Human Rights Law, UCLA JURIS. REV. 238 (2008) (discussing the reconcep-
tualization of the human rights subject by paying attention to sex/gender differences). 
28. Radha Jhappan, The Equality Pit or the Rehabilitation of Justice, 10 CANADIAN J.WOMEN
& L. 60, 74 (1998). 
29. Nicola Lacey, Feminist Perspectives on Ethical Positivism, in JUDICIAL POWER, DEMOCRACY, 
AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 89, 111 (Tom Campbell & Jeffrey Goldsworthy eds., 2007). 
30. This “universal mandate [] requires local interpretation to be culturally relevant and 
critically useful.” Brooke A. Ackerly & Susan Moller Okin, Feminist Social Criticism and 
the International Movement for Women’s Rights as Human Rights, in DEMOCRACY’S EDGES
134, 141 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999). 
31. Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 
20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008–2009). 






   
     
        
acknowledges the range of their responses32 to the many forms of discrimi-
nation and subordination they experience. It is also mindful of the danger 
of hierarchicalizing33 those differences. 
Section II is devoted to the frst prong of the nexus—sex/gender ideology
as a component of culture and politics. First, the section explores a shifting 
dynamic beginning with the legitimation of sex equality in the socialist era 
and then moves on to political and cultural struggles in the post-socialist 
era between supporters of sex equality in states purporting to be European 
liberal democracies and those forces seeking to delegitimate sex equality. 
Section II(A) briefy discusses the principle of sex equality—the socialist 
answer in theory and practice to the ‘woman question’—implemented in the
state’s organization of production, consumption, and social reproduction. 
In many ways, sex equality was one of socialism’s signature legitimating 
principles. That said, at different times in all socialist states, there were sig-
nifcant inconsistencies and contradictions in the prevailing state authored 
and disseminated sex/gender ideology, especially when it trumpeted es-
sentialized sex/gender differences to accommodate shifts at times in public 
policies and institutional practices associated with economic development 
imperatives. In effect, notwithstanding socialist state achievements beneft-
ing women—the provision of education, employment, and social welfare 
benefts—like their Western opponents in the Cold War, socialist states were 
still fraternal patriarchies. The claim in this section is that ideologically and, 
at times, in practice, socialist sex/gender ideology and practice is a complex 
legacy in the region. 
Section II(B) addresses that complex legacy in the post-socialist order. It 
develops the argument that with the collapse of socialism, cultural and politi-
cal contestations over the status of women surfaced openly as post-socialist 
states adjusted to imposition of market economies and to the operation 
of state institutions reformed to conform to liberal democratic norms and 
practices such as constitutionalism, a rule of law, inclusionary democratic 
institutions, and state accountability for its human rights obligations. 
In those contestations, women’s rights NGOs of varying strengths and 
capacities worked to legitimate the internationally and regionally recognized
modern women’s rights canon at the more concrete levels of regime and 
output legitimacy, rather than allowing it to languish at the abstract polity 
level of de jure commitment. That canon, emerging from arguments devel-
oped by activists, lawyers, and scholars from many countries, articulates an 
expansive vision of sex equality in practice. 
32. Women’s agency is “the conscious capacity of individuals or groups to be autonomous 
and create a culture—often one of resistance.” KATALIN FÁBIÁN, CONTEMPORARY WOMEN’S
MOVEMENTS IN HUNGARY: GLOBALIZATION, DEMOCRACY AND GENDER EQUALITY 12 (2009). 
33. See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (2d ed. 2003). 







Two sets of oppositional forces, operating in differing combinations 
with varying levels of strength depending on the country, have focused on 
challenging that canon. One set is what I have designated as a ‘backlash 
trinity’ consisting of conservatives, populist nationalists, and a signifcant 
portion of religious believers. They are prepared to use the state to achieve 
the reinstatement of a retraditionalized, fraternal patriarchal social order, 
thereby delegimating sex equality. They deny the political, cultural, and legal
salience of the state’s contemporary women’s human rights obligations that 
may require state action to implement. The other set consists of neo-liberals 
committed to market-based policies regardless of their disparate gender-based
impacts that create inequality by penalizing women. Neo-liberals oppose 
state intervention to reduce the harm of sex as well as class, race, ethnic, 
and sexual orientation based post-socialist inequalities—many of which have
been generated or invigorated by the operation of an allegedly amoral and 
neutral market. For them, state protective and remedial special measures, 
identifed with the human rights canon, interfere with a ‘natural’ social order 
based on individual rewards for successful risk taking. 
Section III turns to law and legal systems—the second component of 
the nexus. Here, the argument is that a reversal of the sex equality legiti-
mation/delegitimation process discussed in Section II, in which socialism 
legitimated sex equality and post-socialism is marked by concerted efforts to 
retraditionalize the sex/gender order, is at work. More specifcally, as Section
III(A) details, at the polity level, socialist law and socialist legal systems were 
formally legitimated as foundational components of the sovereign socialist 
state, at regime and output legitimation levels, they were delegitimated by 
their total subservience to and manipulation by the ruling party and their 
service largely as a repressive arm of the state. Notwithstanding rights provi-
sions in socialist state constitutions, rights principles and legal action based 
therein were irrelevant. 
As Section III(B) discusses, successor post-socialist states, committed to 
the implementation of liberal democratic principles in market-based econo-
mies upheld by rights-based legal systems and a rule of law, have grappled 
with this profound socialist legacy of a delegitimated legal sphere. At the 
same time, they have been confronted with an avalanche of new demands 
on their legal systems generated by reinstatement of a civil law system, the 
addition of constitutionalism as a jurisprudential principle, and legal require-
ments pertaining to EU accession. At regime and output legitimation levels, 
post-socialist legal systems have had, at best, limited success in defecting 
or eliminating popular skepticism regarding law and legal systems as social 
goods—especially when the legal system is perceived to be susceptible to 
signifcant political and economic corruption. In effect, law and legal systems
are weakly legitimated in the region. 





Though women’s rights NGOs engage in a range of activities beyond the 
legal sphere to expand public consciousness regarding sex/gender equality 
in practice, they also rely in part on the state’s willingness and readiness to 
comply with and enforce its binding domestic, regional, and international 
human rights obligations. Consequently, they have a deep stake in a legal 
system’s regime and output legitimation. In most instances, however, their 
legal systems have not been responsive to the allegations of women’s rights 
violations for a variety of reasons also discussed in Section III(B). 
Section IV is devoted to the third component of the nexus—largely state-
funded legal education. Its legitimation per se is not at issue because it is 
the prerequisite for employment in the legal feld. That said, I argue that it 
is also susceptible to the legitimation/delegitimation dynamic analyzed in 
Sections II(B) and III(B). 
With some degrees of variation among socialist states, law faculties, 
like all other university departments, were subject to the ruling Communist 
party’s intrusions and controls. The curriculum, discussed in Section IV(A), 
consisted of socialist law subjects that were unrecognized by prevailing civil 
and common law systems in the rest of the world, and, thus, constituted 
an isolated legal canon. Rights-based jurisprudence, associated with liberal 
democracy, was not relevant to a socialist legality focused on citizens’ du-
ties and obligations. 
Like post-socialist law, post-socialist legal education—now scrubbed of 
its socialist content—faces paradigm shifts generated by liberal democratic 
theory and practice, including an expanded human rights canon. Given the 
post-socialist state’s law and legal system reforms and the extent to which 
adherence to a rule of law that embodies democratic values is a vital com-
ponent of those efforts, one might assume that legal education would also 
be affected. As Section IV(B)(1) documents, however, there is evidence that 
the legal academy has been very selective in its responses to the full range 
of substantive, as well as pedagogical, issues these reforms entail. This article
argues that, in addition to the cultural, political, and legal system impediments
to law curriculum reform and the modernization of legal education, there 
are subject-specifc barriers to academic recognition of women’s rights. That 
said, prompted by hope for change, Section IV(B)(2) develops suggestions for
a possible expansion of stakeholder engagement in law curriculum reform, 
and Section IV(C) draws upon a wide range of contemporary academic op-
tions for including women’s rights in an evolving modern law curriculum. 
2014 The “Woman Question” in Post-Socialist Legal Education
  
  




        
             
    
   




II. GRAPPLING WITH “THE WOMAN QUESTION”: IDEOLOGY, 
CULTURE, AND POLITICS 
A. Sex Equality and Socialist States 
For Europe, east and west, the pedigree of sex equality can be traced to 
wide-ranging discussions beginning in the mid-nineteenth century of the 
“woman question” encompassing the nature of women’s roles and the 
extent of their contributions to modern society.34 In the pre-1917 political 
spectrum, women’s emancipation was touted as part of a proposed radical 
socialist and communist new and modern political, economic, cultural, and 
legal order. Women would be liberated from the dual oppression of existing 
patriarchal sex/gender systems35 in which power and privilege on symbolic 
and material levels were distributed among and protected by men according 
to their socioeconomic class and, in some parts of existing empires, their 
privileged ethnicity. Women would enjoy full equality with men. For many 
socialist and communist women, “socialism was not just the only political 
stream that advocated women’s equality . . . they themselves were deeply 
convinced that the only way to social justice, including gender equality, 
was through socialism.”36 Sex equality was, in effect, one of the signature 
principles for the legitimation of a new polity. 
In the 1917 Bolshevik assumption of power in Russia, as well as in the 
post-World War II ascendancy of communist parties in Central and Eastern 
Europe, women were proclaimed equal citizens with men in a new socialist 
modernizing37 order headed by a vanguard ruling party.38 In this dramati-
34. Francisca De Haan, On Retrieving Women’s Cultural Heritage Especially the History 
of Women’s Movements in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, in TRAVELING HERI-
TAGES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COLLECTING, PRESERVING AND SHARING WOMEN’S HISTORY 69 (Saskia E. 
Wieringa ed., 2008). 
35. Women were subordinated to men within their class because they were economically 
dependent on them; at the same time, women of the lower classes shared a subordinated
position with men of their class in the larger economic, political, and legal order. FREDERIC
ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE 192–201(New York: Pathfnder 
Press, 1972). 
36. A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS AND FEMINISMS IN CENTRAL, EASTERN AND SOUTH-
EASTERN EUROPE: 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES 8 (Francesca De Haan et al. eds., 2006). 
37. Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, Sexual Equality in Soviet Policy: A Developmental Perspective,
in WOMEN IN RUSSIA 117–18 (Dorothy Atkinson et al. eds., 1977). 
38. The party possessed a monopoly over teleological knowledge and spoke, as well as 
acted, in the name of a collective common good “[to] redistribute the social product 
in the interests of the general welfare.” Katherine Verdery, From Parent-state to Family 
Patriarchs: Gender and Nation in Contemporary Eastern Europe, 8 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES
225, 229 (1994). 





   
     
    
  







    




cally changed organization of society, socialist consciousness regarding sex 
equality would have an impact on all aspects of life.39 
A full discussion of socialist sex equality in ideology and practice as a 
legitimating principle is beyond the scope of this article. The abbreviated 
discussion in this section is designed to remind the reader of its signifcance 
as well as its limitations as part of the cultural and political legacy of post-
socialist states. 
Socialist state constitutions—polity legitimating documents—contained 
a sex equality provision that was showcased as a radical departure from the 
posture and practices of ‘hypocritical’ Western capitalist countries claiming to
be committed to liberal democratic principles of equality and constitutional-
ism, but lacking such an important symbolic statement. Each socialist state 
also claimed that sex equality was more than a domestic de jure principle 
because it was implemented in state policies40 and, after WWII, was strongly 
supported by the socialist bloc in the United Nations.41 
Women were affrmatively recognized as a specifc constituency42 of the 
ruling party. Women’s interests, identifed broadly with welfare, work, and 
housing,43 were said to be represented organizationally either by the ruling 
party’s women’s section or a sole, offcially recognized women’s organiza-
tion and institutionally by a government department mandated to address 
women’s and children’s welfare.44 At different times in different socialist 
countries, women also were assured representation in various state organs 
through a quota system45—a mechanism that was not available in Western 
democracies. 
39. Remaining traditional patriarchal practices and values were explained away in formulaic
offcial assertions as residual. See, e.g., DOUGLAS NORTHRUP, VEILED EMPIRE: GENDER AND POWER
IN STALINIST CENTRAL ASIA (2004). 
40. In the 1950s, the Soviet government declared that gender equality had been achieved, 
and many other socialist countries followed suit. Sharon Wolchik, Women and the State 
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in WOMEN, THE STATE AND DEVELOPMENT 44, 45 (Sue 
Ellen Charlton et al. eds., 1989). 
41. Socialist states were among the early ratifying parties of the major women’s rights in-
ternational instrument. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, adopted 18 Dec. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (1980), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1981) [hereinafter 
CEDAW]. 
42. Women were related to the state not as individual citizens but as members of a po-
litically constructed “corporate” (like working class or youth) group—women—which 
had specifc tasks, characteristics, and opportunities. Éva Fodor, Power, Patriarchy, and 
Paternalism: An Examination of the Nature of State Socialist Authority 28 (Ph.D. diss., 
UCLA, 1997). 
43. Group struggles around issues such as equal pay and the position of women in society 
were seen as superfuous in a political system formulated around ideological principles 
of egalitarianism in which most welfare and social care was, in fact, provided by the 
state. Barbara Einhorn & Charlotte Sever, Gender and Civil Society in Central and Eastern
Europe, 5 INT’L FEMINIST J. POLITICS 163, 166 (2003).
44. Susan Gal, Movements of Feminism: The Circulation of Discourses About Women, in
RECOGNITION STRUGGLES, supra note 12, at 100. 
45. Suzanne Lafont, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Women in the Post-Communist 
States, 34 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 203, 207 (2001). Also see Éva Fodor, 












           
   
  
  
        
  
     




State propaganda highlighted these commitments and innovations as 
signifcant and positive benefts of the socialist system. However, there were 
no mechanisms outside the party or the state apparatus it controlled that 
were able to determine the accuracy of offcial sex equality claims.46 The 
political reality was that “the positions [women] held in parliaments gave 
them little decision making power in a political system which formulated 
policy and legislation almost exclusively at the level of the Party’s Central 
Committees and Politburos in which women had diminishing or invisible 
levels of representation.”47 Women’s participation in offcial organs and 
state controlled organizations meant that they, like their male counterparts, 
rubber-stamped decisions made by the upper echelons of each state’s rul-
ing party—a powerful male dominated and controlled nomenklatura (ruling 
class)48 linked in a Soviet-led fraternal socialist brotherhood. 
That said, socialist state policies did provide women a range of tangible 
benefts identifed with sex equality—“opportunities for their educational and
occupational advancement, cultural and material enrichment, and social 
engagement . . . [as well as] new roles and identities . . . [and] a range of 
social benefts- from universal education and healthcare to state-subsidized 
vacations.”49 Since a large, educated labor force was needed to transform 
society,50 each socialist state recruited large numbers of women to work 
outside the home51 in a greater variety of job classifcations52 than in Western
economies. Although during the 1970s and 1980s in a number of socialist 
Smiling Women and Fighting Men: The Gender of the Communist Subject in State 
Socialist Hungary, 16 GENDER & SOC’Y 240 (2002), for a discussion of the Hungarian 30 
percent quota for women’s participation in the party, as well as for occupying positions 
of authority. 
46. By their fling a reservation to CEDAW, supra note 41, art. 29(1), which specifes ap-
plicable procedures in case of a dispute regarding whether the state party has acted in 
compliance with the Convention, all socialist states protected themselves from serious 
external scrutiny regarding their implementation of Convention provisions. Monika Platek,
Hostages of Destiny: Gender Issues in Today’s Poland, 76 FEMINIST REV. 5, 7 (2004).
47. Einhorn & Sever, supra note 43, at 168. 
48. At the higher levels, occupied overwhelmingly by men, party membership increased 
“political capital” and, thus, the ability for attaining privileges more than extensive 
economic resources. Tanja van der Lippe & Éva Fodor, Changes in Gender Inequality 
in Six Eastern European Countries, 41 ACTASOCIOLOGIA 131, 145–46 (1998).
49. Jill Massino & Shana Penn, Introduction, in GENDER POLITICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN STATE SOCIALIST
EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE 2 (Shana Penn & Jill Massino eds., 2009). 
50. Wage labor also had a strong ideological pull—a means of undercutting female subor-
dination, a central avenue for female self-realization, mitigation against the isolation of 
domestic drudgery, and a contribution to the building of socialism. LYNNE HANEY, INVENTING
THE NEEDY: GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE IN HUNGARY 34 (2002). 
51. Zuzana Jezerska, Gender Awareness and the National Machineries in the Countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, in MAINSTREAMING GENDER, DEMOCRATIZING THE STATE? INSTITUTIONAL
MECHANISMS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 170 (Shirin M. Rai ed., 2003). 
52. High-Level Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Fourth World Conference on Women, 
The Role of Women in the Transition Process: Facing a Major Challenge, 17–21 Oct. 
1994, ¶10–13, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/RW/HLM/5 (5 Aug. 1994) [hereinafter Role of Women].






    
  
         
   
     
  
   
  
states, as birthrates fell and economic development faltered, labor policies 
premised on women working the double shift were challenged within ruling 
parties by proposals to remove women from the wage labor force. The state 
also ensured that women had far greater access to all levels of education 
than their Western counterparts. Since women were needed for both labor 
and reproduction, socialist states developed the world’s most encompassing 
welfare systems, providing generous welfare benefts (child care, health care,
social insurance, and maternity leave)53 that were vital for women who, as 
discussed below, still remained responsible for the gendered tasks of family 
care.54 Moreover, during most decades in most socialist countries, access 
to divorce and abortion—though not to reliable contraception—enabled 
women to exercise some measure of control over marriage and reproduction
unavailable to their Western counterparts. 
Each socialist state had a well-developed, party-authored and offcially 
disseminated55 sex/gender ideology anchored in the foundational legitimating
principle of sex equality. During the early phase of Bolshevik consolidation 
of power, the emancipation of women briefy had androgynous aspects.56 
Subsequent versions of socialist sex/gender ideology, however, relied on the 
premise that men and women were both equal and “different.” The latter 
was attributable to men and women’s sexed bodies, which generated es-
sentialized complimentary natures of masculinity and femininity, expressed 
and confrmed in social practices. 
Take, for example, the question of the strength needed for socialist 
labor-based modernization. Socialist sex/gender ideology posited that men 
possessed an essentialized strength endowing them with the capabilities 
for leadership in socialist political, economic, and cultural life. Not coinci-
dentally, certain types of highly rewarded employment in the core sectors 
of socialism—the higher levels57 of bureaucracy, heavy industry, the army, 
and the apparatus of repression—were almost wholly male and based on 
presumed masculine strengths, skills, or capacities as prerequisites. As sole 
employer, the state channeled women into sectors—healthcare, textiles, 
school teachers, offce clerks, salespersons, and administrative workers—as-
sociated with female skills and caretaking capacities. These jobs had lower 
53. Alena Heitlinger, The Impact of the Transition from Communism on the Status of Women 
in the Czech and Slovak Republics, in GENDER POLITICS AND POST-COMMUNISM 95 (Nanette 
Funk & Magda Mueller eds., 1993). 
54. “State socialism ‘emancipated’ women not as equal citizens but as worker-mothers.” 
BARBARA EINHORN, CINDERELLA GOES TO MARKET: CITIZENSHIP, GENDER AND WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN
EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 40 (1993). 
55. See Janet Elise Johnson & Jean C. Robinson, Living Gender, in LIVING GENDER AFTER COM-
MUNISM 1 (Janet E. Johnson & Jean C. Robinson eds., 2007). 
56. See Zuzana Kiczková & Etela Farkašová, The Emancipation of Women: A Concept That 
Failed, in GENDER POLITICS AND POST-COMMUNISM, supra note 53, at 84, 85. 
57. Verdery, supra note 38, at 233. 
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wage scales than largely male sectors,58 received less state investment, 
and were considered less prestigious because they were strategically less 
important. In effect, despite the sex equality principle, socialist labor forces 
were sex-stratifed. 
In the crucial sphere of biological and social reproduction, men’s es-
sentialized strength was acknowledged in family life by their status as head 
of household within the paternalist socialist state, though women continued 
to perform the overwhelming preponderance of family care work. Women’s 
essentialized strength lay in socialist motherhood59 and in maintaining 
appropriate female sexuality.60 As child bearers, women were said to be 
suited for the domestic roles of manager and enabler of daily life and, thus, 
responsible for virtually all aspects of social reproduction61—the nurturing, 
caretaking, and supporting of all family members, as well as the provision-
ing of the household. Women’s physical and psychological strengths were 
said to be naturally channeled into sacrifcing and suffering for their family’s 
welfare. Thus, reassuringly, according to ideology, strong women were not 
competitors with strong men. 
Although, depending on the decade and country, certain state pro-
mulgated campaigns encouraged men to participate in some household 
activities, there were no major sustained efforts to reorganize gender-based 
responsibilities in home and family life in the name of sex equality.62 In ef-
fect, no socialist country fully and consistently addressed “one of the most 
fundamental women’s issues—the extent to which the entire economy . . . 
rested on women’s unpaid and underpaid labor.”63 
Of course, the hegemonic sex/gender norms and role prescriptions, 
articulated by the state and party in offcial campaigns, were not adhered to 
by all citizens at all times in all socialist countries. Some “negotiated around 
or resisted gender . . . more evidently as coercion waned.”64 That said, in 
58. Van der Lippe & Fodor, supra note 48, at 138. 
59. With the exception of Romania, post-Stalinist societies equated proper femininity with 
“voluntary motherhood,” Elena Zdravomyslova & Anna Temkina, Gendered Citizenship 
in Soviet and Post-Soviet Societies, in NATION AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 107 
(Vera Tolz & Stephenie Booth eds., 2005), though in practice, state policies buttressed 
by propaganda campaigns manipulated women’s choices. 
60. Lynne Attwood, Young People, Sex and Sexual Identity, in GENDER, GENERATION AND IDENTITY
IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 96 (Hilary Pilkington ed., 1996). 
61. In 1987, Gorbachev admitted that mistakes in misinterpreting the role of women lie 
in the fact that “women no longer [had] enough time to perform their everyday duties 
at home” and that many problems (in behavior, morals, culture, and production) were 
partially “caused by the weakening of family ties and slack attitude to family respon-
sibilities.” He characterized this situation as a “paradoxical result of our sincere and 
politically justifed desire to make women equal with men in everything” and suggested 
“women return to their purely womanly mission.” Lafont, supra note 45, at 207. 
62. Zillah Eisenstein, Eastern European Male Democracies: A Problem of Unequal Equality, 
in GENDER POLITICS AND POST-COMMUNISM, supra note 53, at 303, 308. 
63. BARBARA ALPERN ENGEL, WOMEN IN RUSSIA 1700–2000, at 232 (2004). 
64. Johnson & Robinson, supra note 55, at 6. 
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the context of a totalizing party/state system, that controlled resources as 
well as orchestrated and reinforced sex/gender ideology,65 there was limited 
personal agency to do so and the repertoire was limited.66 
B. Post-Socialist Contestation over Women’s Rights 
1. Fraternal Patriarchy as an Ordering Principle in Post-Socialist States 
As signs of socialism’s collapse accelerated during the late 1980’s, negotia-
tions for a transition to a new democratic order commenced in several states.
But even in those states that had well-developed dissident movements67— 
aided by transnational human rights networks68 supporting Western liberal 
democratic values—in which women were actively involved,69 very few 
women participated in those crucial negotiations.70 Notwithstanding the 
prospect that a version of inclusionary liberal democracy would replace 
socialism, women were invisible in the foundational frst steps away from 
the authoritarian past. 
With the advantage of hindsight, the reasons for these developments 
are clear. First, the naturalized cultural understanding that politics is still a 
masculine prerogative, especially at the higher levels, was carried over from 
socialist fraternal patriarchy to newly organized political parties whose top 
65. Nanette Funk, Introduction, in GENDER POLITICS AND POST-COMMUNISM, supra note 53, at 1, 
4. 
66. Massino & Penn, supra note 49, at 8–9. 
67. In most countries, there were not many lawyers among dissidents. Dimitrina Petrova, 
Political and Legal Obstacles to the Development of Public Interest Law, 5 E. EUR. CONST. 
REV. 62, 70 (1996). Thus, when socialist systems began to wane, the organized bar in 
most countries was ill prepared to assume a leadership role. William D. Meyer, Facing 
the Post-Communist Reality: Lawyers in Private Practice in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Republics of the Former Soviet Union, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1019, 1038 
(1994–1995). 
68. Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Accords and Political Change in Eastern Europe, in
THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 205 (Thomas Risse, 
Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999). 
69. See SHANA PENN, SOLIDARITY’S SECRET: THE WOMEN WHO DEFEATED COMMUNISM IN POLAND (2006); 
Yvonne Galligan, Enlargement, Gender and Governance: The Civil and Political Par-
ticipation and Representation of Women in Central and Eastern Europe, Final Report 
to European Commission, Contract No. HPSE-CT2002-000115, at 51–53 (2006), for 
a discussion of women’s contribution to democratization movements in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. Also see Einhorn & Sever, supra note 43, at 169, for women’s partici-
pation in the Dialogue Group and the Danube Circle in Hungary. 
70. See Sylwia Chutnik, Transformers or the Changes in Poland after 1989 as Seen by a 
30-Year-old, in WOMEN IN TIMES OF CHANGE 1989–2009, at 41 (Agnieszka Grzybek ed., 
2009), available at http://www.boell.pl/downloads/Women_in_Times_of_Change_WWW. 
pdf. See also Elzbieta Matynia, Provincializing Global Feminism: The Polish Case, 70 
SOC. RES. 518 (Summer 2003). 






         
  
    
  
  
   
        
      
       
     
   
       
      
  
  




echelons continued to be dominated by men.71 Prevailing political rhetoric 
emphasized new opportunities as well as a return to a “natural” order dis-
rupted and distorted by socialism—to Europe, to the nation, to the reinstate-
ment of private property, and even to the prospect of a retraditionalization of 
the sex/gender order. In most states, parliamentary quotas for women were 
eliminated on the grounds that they were an undemocratic practice,72 and 
a precipitous drop in the number of women elected to national parliaments 
followed.73 Second, there were high stakes in the transition era of political 
and economic dismantling or reforming of state institutions, the re-distribution
of political and economic resources, the selective protection of human 
rights such as speech in an independent media, the reform of state police 
powers focusing on domestic targets, as well as on prisons or other closed 
institutions like mental hospitals, and the rights of co-ethnics, designated as 
minorities, in adjacent states.74 By retaining a sex equality provision75 in their
post-socialist constitutions, assuming their predecessors’ international human
rights obligations, and ratifying the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, post-socialist governments 
could proffer lip service to formal (de jure) sex equality. Third, the sex/gender
based disparate economic impact of early neo-liberal structural adjustment 
policies, which produced market-driven social re-stratifcation and began 
the process of undermining state guaranteed economic and social rights,76 
71. JACQUI TRUE, GENDER, GLOBALIZATION, AND POSTSOCIALISM: THE CZECH REPUBLIC AFTER COMMUNISM 29 
(2003). 
72. Galligan, supra note 69, at 58–60. 
73. Maria Todorova, The Bulgarian Case: Women’s Issues or Feminist Issues?, in GENDER POLI-
TICS AND POST-COMMUNISM, supra note 53, at 30, points out that some women considered 
politics in the new order as equally unsavory and corrupt as in the prior one and, thus, 
best left to men. Other women may have bought into the illusion that once democracy 
was achieved, women would automatically beneft. See also Galligan, supra note 69, 
at 64–85, for an analysis of barriers to women’s political representation. 
74. Edwin Rekosh, Constructing Public Interest Law: Transnational Collaboration and Ex-
change in Central and Eastern Europe, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 66 (2008). 
75. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [CONST. OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION] 25 Dec. 1993, art. 19; 
KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIE [CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND] 2 Apr. 1997, art. 33; 
A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [CONST. OF HUNGARY] 20 Aug. 1949, art. 66; CONSTITUTIA
ROMANIEI [CONST. OF ROMANIA] 8 Dec. 1991, art 4; KOHCTИTYЦIЯ YKPAїHИ [CONST. OF UKRAINE] 
28 Jun. 1996, art. 24; SAKARTVELOS K’ONSTITUTSIA [CONST. OF GEORGIA] 24 Aug. 1995, art. 14; 
LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [CONST. OF LITHUANIA] 24 Oct. 1992, art. 29; KONSTITUTSIYA NA
REPUBLIKA BALGARIYA [CONST. OF BULGARIA] 13 Jul. 1991, art. 6; ÚSTAVA ČESKOSLOVENSKÉ SOCIALISTICKÉ
REPUBLIKY [CONST. OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA] 11 Jul. 1960, art. 20. 
76. Kornelia Slavova, Looking at Western Feminisms Through the Double Lens of Eastern 
Europe and the Third World, in WOMEN AND CITIZENSHIP IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 252 
(Jasmina Lukic, Joanna Regulska & Darja Zavirsek eds., 2006), identifes this process at 
“the intersection of class, nation, ethnicity, religion, gender and sexual orientation that 
had been suppressed and masked before as ‘sameness’ and ‘equality’ . . . exploded 
(or imploded rather).” True argues, “questions of equality—for instance between the 
new rich and poor or between men and women—were discredited and could only be 
addressed in the language of capitalism and freedom.” TRUE, GENDER, GLOBALIZATION, AND
POST-SOCIALISM, supra note 71, at 11. 














   
   




placed wealth in men’s hands.77 Over time, most women experienced a 
declining economic status at a faster rate than men.78 Arguably, women’s 
preoccupation with immediate economic concerns and family responsibilities
may have further constrained any wide-spread enthusiasm on their part for 
involvement in unwelcoming male dominated political activity. 
There were, of course, women who were undeterred by these daunting 
developments. These women turned to a newly developing sphere79 in the 
region—civil society80—situated between the state and the citizenry and 
populated by new organizational entities designated as NGOs.81 As NGOs 
developed expertise on specifc women’s rights issues such as reproductive 
rights or violence against women, they became attractive project partners for
democratic, change-oriented European and North American governmental 
and private funders. In turn, external funders were attractive sources of support
for NGOs who lacked reliable parliamentary allies and who experienced, 
at best, short-lived state recognition and very modest support for projects in 
the wake of the 1995 UN Conference on the Status of Women in Beijing.82 
Over time, a number of NGOs in each post-socialist state developed 
the skill and capacity to participate in political and legal fora at multiple 
77. Privatization, which soon involved austerity programs, produced corruption, asset strip-
ping, and “get rich quick” deals reminiscent of “stealing from the state” in socialist times 
at a far more extensive level. Id. at 14. 
78. The immediate, palpable consequence of the collapse and rapid implementation of 
neoliberal economic policies, dismantling state-owned enterprises, was economic dis-
location—more specifcally, unemployment (unknown under full-employment socialism)
and drastic reductions in social insurance benefts. Sex-neutral on their face, in fact, 
both developments had a disparate impact on women who were more likely to be 
unemployed and whose economic hardships were exacerbated by the curtailment of 
social insurance benefts. Role of Women, supra note 52, ¶19, notes this trend began 
in the 1980s.
79. Under socialism, power at the center came from incapacitating actual or potential loci of
organization—ensuring that no one else could get things done or associate for purposes 
other than those of the center. As a result, the intermediate space between state and 
households was cleansed of all independent organizations. “[A]ll manner of associa-
tions were either attached to the state, locked in a struggle of cooperation with it, or 
placed under severe pressure from it.” Katherine Verdery, Ethnic Relations, Economies 
of Shortage, and The Transition in Eastern Europe, in SOCIALISM: IDEALS, IDEOLOGIES, AND LOCAL
PRACTICE 173, 183 (C. M. Hann ed., 1993). 
80. “Civil society represented values and virtues such as individual freedom, co-operation, 
spontaneity, solidarity, public initiative, protest, intellectual critique, recognized political
dissent and many other aspects of communal life destroyed by the Communists.” Jiří 
Přibáň, Reconstituting Paradise Lost: Temporality, Civility, and Ethnicity in Post-Communist
Constitution Making, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 407, 413 (2004). But see MORJÉ HOWARD, THE
WEAKNESS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2003), for a discussion of the limita-
tions of these groups. 
81. Amanda Sloat, The Rebirth of Civil Society: The Growth of Women’s NGOs in Central 
and Eastern Europe, 12 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 437 (2005). In the voluminous literature 
on NGOs, they are not without their critics. 
82. See Jezerska, supra note 51, at 173–75, for a discussion of the follow-up 1996 Bucharest 
Conference on the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in Central and 
Eastern Europe, which defned eleven priority objectives relevant to women’s status in 
the region. 
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levels—domestic, regional, and international. They collected data, spoke 
truth to power, and conducted consciousness-raising campaigns, relied on 
political and legal strategies of naming and shaming, and fled complaints 
and lawsuits. NGOs provided concrete evidence that their state’s reliance 
on pro forma gestures or a superfcial formal equality approach to women’s 
rights issues, was and continues to be an inadequate substitute for the 
implementation of substantive sex equality reforms. As NGOs continue to 
challenge post-socialist states’ claims to being liberal democracies, they send
a clear message: Post-socialist “democracy” is a male-dominated system83 
that is yet another iteration of highly adaptable fraternal patriarchy. 
2. Post-Socialist Retraditionalization and the Delegitimation of 
Women’s Rights 
Two distinctive types of coalitions in the region actively seek to undermine 
and delegitimate sex/gender equality principles and the implementation of 
women’s rights as obliged under regional and international human rights 
jurisprudence as part of their political, cultural, and legal agendas. One 
coalition consists of conservatives, populist nationalists, and Catholic or 
Orthodox Christian clergy and their followers, all of whom are allies in 
what this article characterizes as a “backlash trinity.” The other consists 
of relative newcomers to politics and culture in the region—supporters of 
neo-liberalism developed in western economies. While a full discussion 
of both coalitions is beyond the scope of this article, Sections 2(a) and (b) 
identify each coalition’s major sex/gender ideology themes, as well as their 
positions on both the role and rule of law, which have implications for the 
state’s commitment to implementing its women’s rights obligations. 
a. The Backlash Trinity: Conservativism, Religion, and Populist 
Nationalism 
Backlash trinity allies—conservative, religious, or populist nationalist—rely 
on a shared historical narrative to support their fraternal patriarchal vision 
of the appropriate social order. Once upon a time, in a romanticized and 
ideal pre-socialist world, the norms and practices of a “natural” patriarchal 
sex/gender order were observed, reinforced, and reproduced in political, 
legal, and cultural arrangements.84 Regardless of prevailing class stratifca-
tion, men—by virtue of their bravery and sense of duty—were charged with 
defending the honor of their women, families, communities, nations, and 
83. See Zillah Eisenstein, Writing Bodies on the Nation for the Globe, in WOMEN, STATES, AND
NATIONALISM: AT HOME IN THE NATION? 35 (Sita Ranchod-Nilsson & Mary Ann Tetreault eds., 
2000). 
84. Andjelka Milič, Nationalism and Sexism: Eastern Europe in Transition, in EUROPE’S NEW
NATIONALISM 169 (Richard Caplan & John Feffer ed., 1996). 











   
    
  
 
religious faith.85 Men’s masculinity was privileged and rewarded in law and 
in practice; they were the naturally ordained heads and protectors of fami-
lies; they were endowed with and exercised familial entitlements. Women’s 
identity, including their cabined sexuality,86 was derived from and dependent
upon their connections to men. They performed traditional essentialized 
biological and social reproductive tasks identifed with femininity—mother, 
homemaker, and transmitter of the nation’s language and culture to their chil-
dren—in service to the patriarchal family, nation, and church. In that service,
they displayed iconic capacities for sacrifce, forgiveness, and suffering.87 
Enter socialism with its party-authored and state-imposed disruptive 
‘unnatural’ sex equality principles implemented in state policies. Since 
women, like men, relied on the state for employment and welfare services, 
they were no longer dependent on their male providers and protectors. Enter 
socialism with its hostility to and repression of patriarchal religion that ac-
companied and justifed the pre-socialist sex/gender order. Enter socialism, 
which, depending on the country and time period, relied instrumentally on 
shifting strategies of mobilizing88 or repressing nationalism which supported 
an undisguised patriarchal sex/gender ideology. 
Now, fast forward to the post-socialist era. In the wake of socialism’s 
collapse and the ensuing economic insecurity, post-socialist states jettisoned 
one of socialism’s foundational polity legitimation claims—the vindication 
of an ethnically undifferentiated working class freed from capitalist servi-
tude and traditional religion—and replaced it with historically and cultur-
ally shared sentiments of community, national identity, and ethnic unity. 
Post-socialist state constitutions and declarations of sovereignty proclaimed 
that the “state is the realization of the nation’s will to statehood.”89 In some 
states, that identity was connected to a traditional Christian church,90 which, 
regardless of whether it cooperated with the socialist state during the godless
85. See Joane Nagel, Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of 
Nations, 21 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 242 (2001). 
86. Nationalism involves the “sexualization of ethnicity . . . an omnipresent feature of 
interethnic relations that dramatically enhances loyalty and raises the emotional stakes 
of the community defned by this criterion.” FÁBIÁN, supra note 32, at 132. 
87. “[Mary] has been and still is a symbol of all those qualities that men want women to 
possess: she is saintly, virginal and full of maternal forbearance and devotion.” Platek, 
supra note 46, at 13. The strength of the cult of Mary may vary among countries, but 
both Catholic and Orthodox churches rely on Mary as an iconic fgure for women. 
88. See Přibáň, supra note 80, at 420, for a discussion of nationalist communism in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. 
89. Philip G. Roeder, National Self-Determination and Post-communist Popular Sovereignty,
in NATIONALISM AFTER COMMUNISM, LESSONS LEARNED 204 (Alina Mungiu-Pippidi & Ivan Krastev 
eds., 2004). 
90. Religion played a signifcant role in nineteenth and twentieth century nation building in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Religious affliation helped create ethnic identity, whereas 
in the West national identity emerged as a replacement for the older “religious myth” 
of identity. BEREND, supra note 1, at 188. Churches in the region functioned as secular 
and temporal entities as well. Often the church was the sole institution in a community 
under foreign rule and served as an organ of self-government and defense. Id. at 189. 
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socialist era of spiritual decline,91 claimed to be the courageous repository 
and protector of the organic entity of the nation and its traditional moral 
values, culture, and unique heritage.92 An essential component of that alleg-
edly inseparable mix of culture and religion was and is a divinely ordained 
patriarchal sex/gender order. 
These hitherto suppressed forces—the backlash trinity of conservatives, 
populist nationalists, and devout confessional believers committed to retradi-
tionalization,93 including refeminization and remasculinization94 in the social,
cultural, political, and legal order—surfaced in every post-socialist state. In 
the name of the collective good, traditional gender roles were reinstated 
and reinforced through politics, culture, and law. Women would be “good”/ 
docile girls; men would no longer be “emasculated”95 as they were under 
socialism. This calculated choice of rhetoric, evoking the specter of mass 
masculine gender trauma, was fraught with powerful political, psychologi-
cal, and cultural consequences for both sexes. While men were identifed 
as victims, despite the fact that they were privileged within the socialist 
fraternal patriarchy, socialism played upon status anxieties concerning their 
performance of masculinity, which identifed with potency and control. For 
women, it served notice that they participated in undermining their own men
and were accomplices to, if not instigators of, alleged “pathologies” generated
in socialist family life with destructive carryovers in post-socialist society. 
Initially, the backlash trinity accused women’s rights advocates of being 
lineal descendants of each socialist state’s offcial women’s organization.96 
Now, the trinity relies on such updated labels as “liberal humanist” or 
“radical feminist.”97 But then, as now, such women are said to be unful-
91. See Joanna Z. Mishtal, How the Church Became the State: The Catholic Regime and 
Reproductive Rights in State Socialist Poland, in GENDER POLITICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE, supra
note 49, at 133. 
92. The context of the claim is of crucial importance. “In the context of the early eighties 
the claim that Poland is a Catholic country was a challenge thrown at the oppressive 
system. In a liberal democracy, however, the same words have an entirely different mean-
ing: they are a denial of democratic pluralism made from a neo-nationalist position.” 
Agnieszka Graff, The Quagmire Effect: On the Special Role of the Catholic Church in 
Poland (2009), available at http://www.pl.boell.org/downloads/A._Graff_About_the_Pol-
ish_catolic_church.pdf. 
93. Agnieszka Graff, Lost Between the Waves? The Paradoxes of Feminist Chronology and 
Activism in Contemporary Poland, 4 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD. 100, 108 (2003). 
94. Johnson & Robinson, supra note 55, at 5. 
95. See Joanna Goven, Gender Politics in Hungary: Autonomy and Antifeminism, in GENDER
POLITICS AND POST-COMMUNISM, supra note 53, at 224, 226–27, for a discussion of the anti-
feminist rhetoric employed in Hungary. 
96. Kathleen A. Montgomery & Gabriella Ilonszki, Weak Mobilization, Hidden Majoritarian-
ism, and Resurgence of the Right: A Recipe for Female Under-Representation in Hungary, 
in WOMEN’S ACCESS TO POWER IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (Richard E. Matland & Kathleen A. 
Montgomery eds., 2003). 
97. In the socialist era, feminism was considered redundant because it was associated with 
bourgeois ideology and divided the proletariat; in the post-socialist era, it is associated 
with leftist collectivist ideology. Slavova, supra note 76, at 258. 








       
 
flled—they are sexualized bearers of a foreign ideology98 and betrayers of 
the community, the nation, and its confessional institutions. These women’s 
demands for equal rights with men are designed to decouple women from 
their essentialized femininity by encouraging selfshness with purportedly 
destructive societal consequences including, but not limited to, high divorce 
and low birth rates. 
Each trinity ally challenges the substance of at least some major liberal 
democratic principles of law, especially human rights, and the role and 
rule of law in a modern state. Each ally claims that law, in order to be nor-
matively and empirically legitimate, must be organically connected to the 
prevailing distinctive culture of nation, community, or church from which 
it derives its meaning rather than imported and superimposed by regional 
or international entities. 
Conservatives and religious authorities, while not encouraging hostility 
to the entire human rights canon, are likely to be highly selective in their 
choice of human rights they are prepared to support. Conservatives focus on 
property rights and ignore or decry more inclusionary social and economic 
rights. Confessional authorities, especially in countries where the church 
enjoys a state-recognized privileged position,99 may seek to impose their 
narrower vision of human rights protections in the name of religious freedom
buttressed by the claim that those portions of the human rights canon that 
they oppose, such as women’s rights and sexual orientation rights, are alien 
to the nation and faith that they embody and protect. 
In the populist nationalist canon,100 the nation is a reassuring haven from
the destructive forces of modernity.101 For them, the modern liberal democratic
98. Michaela Frunza & Theodore-Eliza Vacarescu, Introduction, in GENDER AND THE (POST) 
“EAST”/“WEST” DIVIDE 7 (Mihaela Frunză & Theodora-Eliza Vacarescu eds., 2004). 
99. See Alenka Kuhelj, A Socio-Legal View on the Multiculturalism and Religious Changes 
in Post-Communist EU States, 1 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 114 (2007) (discussing three models 
of church-state relations: secularist, positive neutrality, and neutrality). 
100. Přibáň, supra note 80, at 407–31. Tismaneanu identifes the “ideological chaos created by
the collapse of state socialism, leaving populism as the most convenient and frequently 
the most appealing ersatz ideology. Uprootedness, status loss, and uncertainties about 
identity provide fertile ground for paranoid visions of conspiracy and treason; hence 
the widespread attraction of nationalist salvationism.” Vladimir Tismaneanu, Leninist 
Legacies, Pluralist Dilemmas, 18 J. DEMOC. 35, 36 (2007). 
101. András Sajó, Becoming “Europeans”: The Impact of EU “Constitutionalism” on Post-
Communist Pre-Modernity, in SPREADING DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW? 175–76 (Wojciech
Sadurski, Adam Czarnota, & Martin Krygier eds., 2006). Sajó argues that “East European 
nationalism is . . . embedded in a value system that is (at best) indifferent to modernity 
as it grounds itself in past (ascribed and mystical) national glory . . . [a] belief [that] 
does not generate much interest in the ethics of modernity put forward in the rule of law 
(rational accountability for one’s acts, transparency, and predictability through formalism,
etc.).” See Tismaneanu, supra note 100, at 35–36, for a discussion of radical authoritar-
ian trends marked by “intolerance, exclusiveness, rejection of all compromise, extreme 
personalization of political discourse and the search for charismatic leadership” in the 
region. 
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legal canon, which includes a rule of law consciousness and practices that 
are neutral among groups living in a territory,102 as well as broad protection 
of human rights, is illegitimate because it fails to accord proper recognition 
and pre-eminence to the dominant nation. Instead, it relegates the nation 
to becoming the victimized majority.103 Requirements of state compliance, 
especially with regional and international sex/gender equality obligations, 
are reinscribed as punitive actions visited upon the nation—antithetical to 
its interests and culture, its majoritarian collective group rights, and, even 
more apocalyptically, its survival. 
Interestingly, though the backlash trinity virulently denounces the col-
lectivist principles of socialism, it also identifes the desirable political, legal,
social, and cultural order as one in which collective duties to the traditional 
patriarchal hierarchies of family, community, church, and nation—are privi-
leged over individual-oriented, identity-based rights claims associated with 
law in liberal democracies. Like socialism, the trinity, too, is prepared to 
implement its vision by using the power of the state apparatus to undermine 
a broad democratic rule of law system in which sex/gender equality is a 
foundational component. 
Neo-liberalism, the post-socialist replacement for socialist state-driven col-
lectivism, was introduced by Western aid donors and foreign economic advi-
sors to newly elected post-socialist governments104 charged with dismantling
socialist command/control economies. It was presented as foundational to 
any transition into democratic European statehood.105 
Neo-liberals claim that their political, economic, and legal agenda 
is based on a set of modern scientifc principles regarding the market as 
the effcient rational mechanism for ordering economic arrangements and 
institutions in order to maximize aggregate gain through exchange.106 That 
market fosters winners and losers107 among corporations that happen to be 
102. Přibáň, supra note 80, at 418. 
103. Aurel Braun, The Incomplete Revolutions: The Rise of Extremism in East-Central Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union, in THE EXTREME RIGHT: FREEDOM AND SECURITY AT RISK 146, 150 
(Aurel Braun & Stephen Scheinberg eds., 1997). 
104. “Post-socialist ruling classes lost one ideology and needed another. Neo-liberalism with 
its focus on the market panacea suits their purposes well, silently reproducing their 
domination while denying responsibility for economic failures and injustice.” Michael 
Burawoy, Grounding Globalization, in GLOBAL ETHNOGRAPHY, FORCES, CONNECTIONS AND IMAGI-
NATIONS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 342 (Michael Burawoy et al. eds., 2000). 
105. See generally TADEUSZ KOWALIK, FROM SOLIDARITY TO SELLOUT: THE RESTORATION OF CAPITALISM IN
POLAND (Eliza Lewandowska trans., 2011). 
106. Martha T. McCluskey, The Politics of Economics in Welfare Reform, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS
HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW AND SOCIETY 193, 194 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence
Dougherty eds., 2005). 
107. Noémi Kakucs & Andrea Petó, The Impact of EU Accession on Gender Equality in Hun-
gary in GENDER, POLITICS AND THE EXPANDING EU, MOBILIZATION, INCLUSION, EXCLUSION 174,187 
(Silke Roth ed., 2008). 







       
 
 







male-controlled,108 which compete—and cooperate, when necessary—to 
leverage their power in domestic and globalized markets. 
By making informed individual choices, exercising privatized agency and
volition, and managing their personal affairs, each individual is accountable 
for their own life. Economic criteria and expectations are an individual’s 
guide for social and ethical life.109 Money and material gain are the concrete 
output measures of the successful exercise of this self-interested, self-realizing
fundamental political value of freedom.110 From this standpoint, “government’s
role, then, is limited to the protection of the entrepreneurial and competitive 
behavior of economically rational individuals . . . [who] provide for their 
own needs and service their own ambitions.”111 It follows that law, a tool of 
the state, should be used sparingly to promote that freedom.112 
Unlike the backlash trinity’s open identifcation with patriarchal sex/ 
gender system norms and prescriptions, neo-liberalism is facially sex/gender 
neutral.113 Its supporters claim that neo-liberal-based policies are primarily 
a “matter of neutral, technical expertise . . . separate from politics and cul-
ture, and not properly subject to specifcally political authority or cultural 
critique.”114 In fact, this dissociation of policy from its larger context is 
misleading. “Neo-liberal policies have been implemented in and through 
culture and politics.”115 Denial of this reality, however, serves a strategic 
purpose; it enables neo-liberals to sidestep responsibility for signifcant de 
facto patterns of discrimination or subordination resulting from their policies.
So, for example, though there is persuasive evidence that gender has been 
a fault line distinguishing winners and losers116 in the post-socialist, neo-
liberal economic restructuring process with longer term consequences,117 
108. CONNELL, THE MEN AND THE BOYS, supra note 24, at 51–52. 
109. JODI DEAN, DEMOCRACY AND OTHER NEO-LIBERAL FANTASIES: COMMUNICATIVE CAPITALISM AND LEFT POLITICS 
51 (2009). 
110. Margaret Thornton, Neoliberal Melancholia: The Case of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 20 
AUST. FEMINIST L. J. 16 (2004). 
111. JOHN L. COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF, ETHNICITY, INC. 50 (2009). 
112. Martha T. McCluskey, Razing the Citizen: Economic Inequality, Gender, and Marriage 
Tax Reform, in GENDER EQUALITY, DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP (Linda McClain 
& Joanna Grossman eds., 2009). 
113. See Isabella Bakker, Identity, Interests and Ideology: The Gendered Terrain of Global 
Restructuring, in GLOBALIZATION, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND MULTILATERALISM 127 (Stephen Gill ed., 
1997). 
114. LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY? NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS, AND THE ATTACK ON 
DEMOCRACY, at xiv, 6 (2003). 
115. Id. 
116. Neoliberalism individualizes poverty and fails to acknowledge that it is structurally distinct 
for each sex because women’s assumption of the overwhelming preponderance of the 
burdens of social reproduction and of time-consuming non-market based labor in the 
private sphere of the family, which increases the likelihood of their impoverishment is 
considered voluntary, if not natural. True, Transitions, supra note 3, at 84. 
117. TRUE, GENDER, GLOBALIZATION, AND POST-SOCIALISM, supra note 71, at 22. 










neo-liberals classify this concern as cultural118; so classifed, it neither war-
rants state remediation nor, for purposes of this article, inclusion in the law 
faculty curriculum. 
Claiming to be a force for modernization, neo-liberalism does not reject 
the entire human rights canon. Instead, it selectively endorses for state imple-
mentation those portions of rights discourse consistent with its ideological 
agenda. It supports a hierarchical rule of law that privileges protection of 
private property rights over other human rights. State interventions for the 
protection of identity-based human rights, such as women’s rights, that are 
identifed as moral imperatives connected to a broader common or collec-
tive good119 are inappropriate, misguided, and detrimental to the natural 
order. To the extent that oppression and exploitation exist, such forces are 
reduced to privatized individual characteristics, experiences, and choices. 
Neo-liberal adherence to anti-statist principles, policies, and practices 
may not mesh completely with the backlash trinity’s support for state inter-
vention designed to engineer a return to a neo-traditional sex/gender order. 
However, neo-liberalism’s well-developed theoretical anti-statist position, dis-
tinguished from the actual use of state supports for economic elites in public 
policies,120 enables its supporters to mask their usually socially conservative 
beliefs and values that marginalize, if not ignore, women’s rights.121 Thus, 
it can be an instrumentally attractive ally for the backlash trinity’s women’s 
rights delegitimation agenda. 
III. GRAPPLING WITH THE “WOMAN QUESTION”: LAW, LEGAL 
SYSTEMS, AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
A. Socialist Law and Legal Systems 
In the wake of the WWI destruction of the region’s Tsarist, Ottoman, Haps-
burg, and Prussian Empires with their differing legal systems, mostly new 
sovereign states were created. These new sovereign states faced the important
118. Delegitimating women’s rights as components of international and constitutional human 
rights law by assigning them only to the sphere of culture (usually considered as tradi-
tion) is distinguishable from a clash between religious or cultural autonomy and gender 
equality arising in connection with claims of immunity from gender equality provisions 
on the grounds of cultural or religious freedom. Frances Raday, Culture, Religion, and 
Gender, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 663 (2003). 
119. Jill Blackmore, Feminist Strategic Rethinking of Human Rights Discourses in Education, 
in JUST ADVOCACY? WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS, TRANSNATIONAL FEMINISMS, AND THE POLITICS OF REPRE-
SENTATION 246–47 (Wendy S. Hesford & Wendy Kozol eds., 2005). 
120. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Martha T. McCluskey, for this comment. 
121. Margaret Thornton, The Demise of Diversity in Legal Education: Globalisation and the 
New Knowledge Economy, 8 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 48 (2001). 













polity legitimation tasks of writing new national law codes and creating 
their own civil law-based legal institutions.122 The October Revolution in 
Russia, however, produced even more dramatic developments. Summarily 
eliminating Tsarist imperial law and shutting down the Tsarist legal system,123 
the Bolsheviks initially relied on revolutionary law and people’s tribunals. 
By the end of the tumultuous frst post-revolutionary decade, a new system 
of socialist law124 and legal institutions were developed, which relied on 
“socialist legality”125 to enforce socialist morality and order126 in the service 
of the political and economic objectives of the collectivist USSR. 
Thirty years later, as Soviet-backed post-WWII regimes consolidated 
control in Central and Eastern Europe, Soviet-inspired socialist law and legal 
system institutions were largely imposed.127 Depending on the period and 
country, there were some allowable differences among fraternal socialist le-
gal systems.128 Every socialist state had “a collective interest-oriented system 
that constitutionally emphasized the reciprocity of rights and obligations, 
especially citizens’ duties, whose failure to be fulflled produced sanctions 
from state or party authorities who were the source of rights.”129 
Socialist state constitutions contained a far more extensive list of hu-
man rights guarantees than Western ones for polity legitimation purposes. 
However, since socialist legal systems did not follow principles of consti-
tutionalism, which would have limited state authority,130 these provisions 
122. Generally speaking the civil law tradition is characterized by reliance on law codes, 
large judiciaries, investigative procedures controlled by the judge, a denial of judicial 
law making, and the historical prestige of law professors. See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL 
TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 136 (3d ed. 2007). 
123. John N. Hazard, The Lawyer Under Socialism, WIS. L. REV. 90, 92–93 (1946) (stating 
the frst offcial decree of the new Bolshevik government closed down the Tsarist legal 
system). 
124. In a state owned and planned economy, private law is absorbed by public law, removing 
socialist law from the civil law orbit. JOHN N. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW: A SEARCH 
FOR THE COMMON CORE OF THE MARXIAN SOCIALIST STATES (1969). 
125. JIŘÍ PŘIBÁŇ, DISSIDENTS OF LAW: ON THE 1989 VELVET REVOLUTIONS, LEGITIMATIONS, FICTIONS OF LEGAL-
ITY, AND CONTEMPORARY VERSION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 62 (2002), identifes socialist legality 
as an example of transforming legal legitimacy into an empty automatism of general 
language using some constitutive formal features of modern rational legality whilst 
actually dismantling the whole system of the rule of law and the proceduralist concept 
of legal legitimacy. 
126. So, for example, there were crime-free streets, but citizens were not safe from arbitrary 
arrest. Braun, supra note 103, at 146. 
127. Zdeněk Kühn, The Democratization and Modernization of Post-communist Judiciaries, in 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AFTER TRANSITION 197–98 (Alberto Febbrajo & Wojciech Sadurski 
eds., 2010). 
128. Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 
43 AM. J. COMP. L. 99–102 (1995). 
129. András Sajó & Vera Losonci, Rule by Law in East Central Europe: Is The Emperor’s New 
Suit a Straitjacket?, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
WORLD 324 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993). 
130. Petrova, supra note 67, at 68. 
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were not invoked or directly applied by courts to any legal issue. Nor were 
acts of party-controlled parliaments subject to meaningful judicial review.131 
“[B]ecause all actions had to emanate from the state and, therefore, have 
some appearance of legality . . . law was bureaucratic and purposive; it 
denied individual rights, as rights might have resulted in independent social 
action.”132 Moreover, since party control and monopolization over the expres-
sion and defense of the public interest confated public and state interest,133 
neither group nor individual legal challenges to the state were possible. 
At the more concrete levels of regime and output legitimation, however, 
socialist law and legal systems were largely delegitimated in every socialist 
state. Socialist law, much of it declaratory in character, was of poor quality, 
with rampant inconsistencies and contradictions.134 Prevailing legal norms 
did not necessarily conform to the general principles/higher legal rules of 
the constitution.135 “The wide gap left to administrative discretion was flled 
by secret regulations granting privileges to the state and the members of the 
nomenklatura.”136 “[O]ften unwritten extra-legal political rules of behavior 
and instructions from unchallengeable administrative or political authorities,
especially the Central Committee of each state’s ruling party, could have 
greater force than legal norms.”137 
Clientelism, favoritism, and a lack of transparency and accountability 
tainted the operation of socialist legal systems.138 Prosecutors,139 tasked 
with the administration of justice, the maintenance of socialist order, the 
protection of the socialist state, and the insurance of respect for the law,140 
were the most powerful legal system offcials and were required to be party 
131. Zdeněk Kühn, Worlds Apart: Western and Central European Judicial Culture at the Onset 
of the European Enlargement, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 547–48 (2004). 
The will of the legislators does not allow . . . that the substance of the legal rules be changed 
under the pretext of interpretation. . . . In bourgeois laws the judge has become the pivot of the 
legal system. Socialist evolution has not made this error. Any remedial “interpretation” is contrary 
to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. 
132. Sajó & Losonci, supra note 129, at 325. 
133. Petrova, supra note 67, at 67. 
134. Kathryn Hendley, Rewriting the Rules of the Game in Russia: The Neglected Issue of 
the Demand for Law, 8 E. EUR. CONST. L.REV. 89 (1999). 
135. Bruno Schönfelder, Judicial Independence in Bulgaria: A Tale of Splendour and Misery, 
57 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 61 (2005). 
136. Sajó & Losonci, supra note 129, at 325. 
137. Dencho Georgiev, The Collapse of Totalitarian Regimes in Eastern Europe and the Inter-
national Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN EAST
CENTRAL EUROPE 331 (Martin Krygier & Adam Czarnota eds., 1999). 
138. BOGUSIA PUCHALSKA, LIMITS TO DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 6
(2011). 
139. Prosecutors participated in two parallel legal systems—an administrative justice system, 
consisting of summary in camera measures to discipline and control citizens without 
their being legally represented and a formal court system in which lawyers participated.
140. OTTO ULČ, THE JUDGE IN A COMMUNIST STATE: A VIEW FROM WITHIN 91–94 (1972). 















     
       




            
members working closely with its hierarchy. With the exception of the high 
court, the judiciary, whose professional educational preparation was often 
problematic,141 was predominantly a poorly paid, relatively low status, female
dominated profession.142 “[J]udges . . . acted as bureaucrats and fulflled the 
expectation that they would promote centrally determined public interests.”143 
In cases that might have political signifcance—especially those where party 
members were involved—judges, mindful of future performance evaluations,
were known to rely on an informal consultative practice of “telephone justice”
to check with the local party apparatus prior to handing down a decision. 
In the professional world of lawyers employed by the state,144 political reli-
ability and adherence to party orthodoxy were important for bar admission; 
meaningful self-governance was largely a fction.145 
In sum, socialist laws and the socialist legal systems interpreting and 
enforcing them lacked an independent existence, though socialist scholars 
and judges 
claimed that, unlike their common law counterparts, they were operating within 
a system of written law emphasiz[ing] their affliation with the Continental system
while condemning what they believed was the primitive and reactionary nature 
of law in the much more dangerous “imperialists” nations, such as the United 
States and Great Britain.146 
The ruling party “might happily use law . . . [but] ultimately was not sub-
ordinate to it.”147 Since the socialist state was not bound by its own laws, 
141. “The judges were ordered to follow the ‘Marxist-Leninist World View’ and to fght 
bourgeois remnants in human thinking.” Kühn, Worlds Apart, supra note 131, at 539.
142. “The percentage of women on the bench was in direct reverse proportion to the general 
level of prestige enjoyed by the profession.” Kühn, Worlds Apart, supra note 131, at 
550. 
143. Sajó & Losonci, supra note 129, at 324. Though there was some independent thinking 
both in legal reasoning (legal dogmatics) and in substantive terms of rights in Eastern 
Europe, “(I)t would be an error, however, to overestimate the importance of these features
especially if one takes into consideration the amount of discretionary power built into 
the fexible texts of the laws and lack of suffcient and independent judicial review.” Id. 
But, Smilov argues that reliance on strict positivism or formalism during the socialist era 
must be contextualized—meaning that, depending on the era and the country, rejection 
of or signifcant limitations on judicial discretion served various functions including ef-
forts to limit the state’s arbitrary authority. Daniel Smilov, Constitutional Culture and the 
Theory of Adjudication: Ulysses as a Constitutional Justice, in CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
AFTER TRANSITION: TOWARDS A NEW SOCIO-LEGAL SEMANTICS 120 (Alberto Febbrajo & Wojciech 
Sadurski eds., 2010). 
144. KATHRYN HENDLEY, TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER: LEGAL REFORM AND LABOR LAW IN THE SOVIET UNION
134 (1996). 
145. Meyer, supra note 67, at 1036. 
146. Kühn, Worlds Apart, supra note 131, at 545–46 (emphasis added). 
147. Martin Krygier & Adam Czarnota, The Rule of Law After Communism: An Introduction, 
in THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN EAST- CENTRAL EUROPE 1 (Martin 
Krygier & Adam Czarnota eds., 1999). 
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state and party offcials could act with a measure of impunity;148 legal system
offcials could not challenge them.149 Citizens could not be protected from 
their rulers, who relied on large networks of informers. 
That said, there were adaptive behaviors of resistance to the repres-
sive socialist legal order. Citizens tried to live a “double life,”150 based on 
a division between formal public life151 and informal private life,152 which 
included avoiding the socialist legal system whenever possible. Involvement 
with the law drew offcial attention to oneself and opened up or facilitated 
further state/party penetration of private relationships with unpredictable 
and, possibly, undesirable outcomes.153 
B. Post-Socialist Law and Legal System Reform and Women’s Rights 
1. Rewriting Laws and Reforming Offcial Practices 
Post-socialism involved reform on a grand scale. Aspects of the past would 
be differentiated from the present and the future.154 For law and legal sys-
148. “The legal system was obscure and discretionary enough to allow for the protection of 
the privileges of the nomenklatura.” Sajó & Losonci, supra note 129, at 326. 
149. HENDLEY, TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER, supra note 144, at 138. 
150. See Mark Morjé Howard, The Leninist Legacy Revisited, in WORLD ORDER AFTER LENINISM
36–38 (Vladimir Tismaneanu et al. eds., 2006), for a discussion of the distinction be-
tween public and private. Also see Jiŕina Šiklová, Courage, Heroism and the Postmodern 
Paradox, 71 SOC. RES. 135 (2004), for a thought provoking account of the double life. 
151. Formal life was held together by the offcial ideology’s compulsory language, constituting
a veritable linguistic subversion of reality in many instances, as citizens tried to create 
the impression of political loyalty at work and in their dealings with state and party in 
relationships often characterized by amorality and distrust. Martin Krygier, The Quality 
of Civility: Post-Anti-Communist thoughts on Civil Society and the Rule of Law, in OUT
OF AND INTO AUTHORITARIAN LAW 236 (András Sajó ed., 2003). 
152. In the authentic private informal life of family and friends dissociated from politics and 
the legal system, relationships were uncoerced and largely based on honesty and trust. 
Family and kin relationships were conceived as a source of mutual resistance to power 
rather than a site of gender oppression. TRUE, GENDER, GLOBALIZATION, AND POST-SOCIALISM, 
supra note 71, at 49–52. See Graff, supra note 93 (discussing the building secure and 
deeply conservative family structures as a defense against an intrusive totalitarian state). 
But see Marina Kurkchiyan, The Illegitimacy of Law in Post-Soviet Societies, in LAW AND
INFORMAL PRACTICES, supra note 18, at 37, for a discussion of instrumental considerations 
and calculations (extra-legal access to goods or services in socialist economies punctu-
ated by scarcity) in the connections established in the informal life. 
153. See Martin Krygier, Virtuous Circles: Antipodean Refections on Power, Institutions, and 
Civil Society, 11 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 36 (1996), for a discussion of socialism’s classic 
powerful model of social relationships to the state—a close combination of dependency 
with distrust given the pervasiveness of the state and that never-quite-known but known-
to-be-great number of those who served it. 
154. Ruti Teitel, Transitional Rule of Law, in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM 279 
(Adam Czarnota, Martin Krygier & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 2005). 









tems, there was a delicate balance between continuity and discontinuity.155 
Popularly elected parliaments were tasked with resurrecting portions of pre-
socialist civil law codes, writing new laws156 guided by the principles, norms,
and practices associated with a liberal democratic state and a neo-liberal 
market-based economy,157 revising or eliminating practices associated with 
socialist legality,158 beginning the process of anchoring constitutionalism as 
a guiding principle in the legal system, and developing and fostering rule 
of law consciousness, norms, and practices.159 
One might assume that this extensive roster of tasks would require 
fedgling post-socialist parliaments to thoughtfully confront “deeply rooted, 
historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of 
law in society and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of 
155. Adam Czarnota, Between Nemesis and Justitia: Dealing with the Past as a Constitutional 
Process, in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM, supra note 154, at 123, 125. 
156. “In Hungary in the frst ffteen months after the formation of the new parliament in 1990 
‘one hundred and eleven laws were passed, and most dealt with such central issues as 
the structure of the ministerial system, the legal position of the deputies, the creation of 
a system of local justice.” Zoltan Barany, The Regional Perspective, in DILEMMAS OF TRANSI-
TION: THE HUNGARIAN EXPERIENCE 105 (Aurel Braun & Zoltan Barany eds., 1999). Between 
1990 and mid 1992, the National Assembly in Czechoslovakia passed more than 500 
laws. DANIELA PIANA, JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITIES IN NEW EUROPE: FROM RULE OF LAW TO QUALITY OF 
JUSTICE 90 (2010). 
157. Neoliberal economists stressed the need to develop a market economy without signif-
cant corresponding legal regulation of new economic entities. Kühn, Post-Communist 
Judiciaries, supra note 127, at 178. Moreover, they and their supporters’ beliefs that free 
market economic reforms would lead to democracy obscured the need for intensive 
support of fedgling democratic institutions. Consequently, elite male hierarchies of 
patronage and personal connections were strengthened. PUCHALSKA, supra note 138, at 
105–06. 
158. Relying in part on European and international human rights norms and US legal mod-
els to legitimate their work product, parliaments decriminalized selected acts, such as 
those associated with socialist repression. Kyriaki Topidi & Alexander H.E. Morawa, 
Prologue: Constitutional Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, in CONSTITUTIONAL EVO-
LUTION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, EXPANSION AND INTEGRATION IN THE EU 4 (2010). Jacques 
DeLisle, Lex Americana? United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and 
Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 UNIV. PENN. J. INT’L ECON. 
L. (1999) (restrictions on free speech and on freedom of association, and restraints on 
leaving one’s country). 
159. Discussions regarding the appropriate focus for analyzing the extent to which a rule 
of law exists usually divide along institutionalist/culturalist lines. Institutionalists focus 
on laws, institutions and the role of lawyers; they are aware of the weakness of public 
institutions after state collapse and identify failures of rights protection and enforcement 
as indicia of state incapacity. Culturalists claim that inhospitable cultural and other lega-
cies are crucial factors—that post-socialist societies lack important cultural prerequisites 
enabling citizens to care about what law says that exist in societies identifed as liberal 
democracies and instead possess cultural legacies incompatible with such ambition. 
Martin Krygier, Institutional Optimism, Cultural Pessimism and the Rule of Law, in THE 
RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN EAST- CENTRAL EUROPE 77, 84–88 
(Martin Krygier & Adam Czarnota eds., 1999). For a combined institutionalist/cultural-
ist approach to rule of law concerns, see András Sajó, Corruption, Clientelism and the 
Future of the Constitutional State in Eastern Europe, 7 EAST EUR. CONS. REV. 37 (1998). 
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a legal system and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied,
perfected, and taught.”160 Instead, in a number of countries, foreign laws 
were translated word for word, at times incorrectly or carelessly and without 
proper comparative analysis, and then immediately enacted—suggesting a 
legal instrumentalism that promotes the idea that law does or should work.161 
The early avalanche of new laws generated a host of demands and 
pressures on legal systems staffed by professionals trained in the socialist 
era whose carryover into the new order was unavoidable and whose re-
education was limited. Since the machinery for maintaining party discipline 
was dismantled,162 the state possessed limited capacity to monitor their per-
formance, which, in turn, reinforced popular skepticism regarding the likely 
effectiveness of post-socialist law and legal system reforms in holding the 
state accountable for its actions or failures to act.163 Over time, it became 
clear that popular expectations regarding the capacity of the post-socialist 
state, under sustained neo-liberal pressure to resolve daily life issues and 
alleviate social risk, would be largely unmet,164 and that the post-socialist 
order did not create the conditions for an outpouring of citizen involvement 
in public life.165 
In the late nineties, as post-socialist states sought to affrm their “return” 
to Europe, overwhelmed parliaments and unprepared judiciaries faced 
another round of legal reform and modernization associated with EU ac-
cession. This also had an impact on the already problematic legal system 
regime and output legitimation. In order to secure a place in the highly 
prized166 EU accession queue, post-socialist states had to meet EU standards 
of conditionality.167 Each Brussels-anointed candidate state168 was required 
160. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 2 (3d ed. 2007). 
161. Zdeněk Kühn, Development of Comparative Law in Central and Eastern Europe, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 228–29 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 
2008); see also David Nelken, Comparativists and Transferability, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITION 459 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003). 
162. Venelin I. Ganev, The Rule of Law as an Institutionalized Wager: Constitutions, Courts 
and Transformative Social Dynamics in Eastern Europe, 1 HAGUE J. RULE OF L. 263, 278–80 
(2009). 
163. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS: INCORPORATION, TRANSFORMATION, AND PERSUA-
SION 259, 468, 517, 526, 555 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011), for essays on Hungary, Poland, 
Russia, Serbia, and Slovakia. 
164. NICOLAI GENOV, GLOBAL TRENDS IN EASTERN EUROPE 33–35 (2010). 
165. Petrova, supra note 67, at 69–72. 
166. The European Union had great symbolic signifcance as a return to Europe, as well 
as practical input, since membership in the EU was a powerful priority of the foreign 
policy of virtually all post–socialist states, as well as a strategic goal for a better future. 
Georgiev, supra note 137, at 330. 
167. See DIMITRY KOCHENOV, EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT AND THE FAILURE OF CONDITIONALITY (2008), for a 
critical analysis of pre–accession conditionality in the felds of democracy and the rule 
of law. 
168. The frst round of post-socialist candidates consisted of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. The second round included Bulgaria and 
Romania. 








    
  






      
    
   
 
to demonstrate the harmonization of its laws with economically oriented 
EU laws and regulations—a standardization of law on a gigantic scale169 
involving the adoption of enormous amounts of transplanted legal concepts, 
rules, and regulatory models. Each candidate state also had to demonstrate 
that it had established an independent judiciary170 and adopted the European
human rights framework.171 In addition, each candidate state had to provide 
evidence of its commitment to a rule of law and progress toward anchoring 
it.172 This condition was met, in large part, by showing the extent to which 
its legal system personnel were trained173 in the new legal discourse. 
The accession process explicitly addressed women’s rights by deem-
ing the “full realization” of democracy contingent on gender equality.174 
Consequently, in their accession submissions, candidate states burnished 
their profles of compliance and harmonization with EU laws and directives 
169. While the European Union’s white paper on Eastern enlargement generated a list of 
1,000 directives to be transposed, the entire acquis consisted of closer to 10,000 direc-
tives. Wade Jacoby, Priest and Penitent: The European Union as a Force in the Domestic 
Politics of Eastern Europe, 8 EAST EUR. CONST. REV. 65 (1999). 
170. See Daniel Smilov, EU Enlargement and the Constitutional Principle of Judicial Inde-
pendence, in SPREADING DEMOCRACY, supra note 101, at 316–17, for an extensive list of 
common standards and rules concerning the independence of the judiciary. See also
FLORENCE BENOÎT-ROHMER & HEINRICH KLEBES, COUNCIL OF EUROPE: TOWARDS A PAN-EUROPEAN LEGAL
AREA (2005). 
171. See Copenhagen Criteria, adopted June 1993, available at http://europa.eu/legislation_ 
summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm, for the EU’s pre-accession 
process. See also The Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 6(1), 1997
O.J. (C 340) 1 (21 Oct. 1997), available at http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty. 
pdf. 
172. The World Justice Project identifes rule of law as consisting of the adherence to the 
following principles: government and its offcials and agents are accountable under the 
law; the laws are clear, publicized, stable, fair, and protect fundamental rights, includ-
ing the security of persons and property; the process by which the laws are enacted, 
administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and effcient; and the laws are upheld, 
and access to justice is provided, by competent, independent, and ethical law enforce-
ment offcials, attorneys or representatives, and judges who are of suffcient number, 
have adequate resources, and refect the makeup of the communities they serve. See
THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX, available at http://www.worldjusticeproject. 
org/rule-of-law-index/. But see Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: 
The Problem of Knowledge, Working Papers, 34 (Democracy and Rule of Law Project, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2003), available at http://carnegieendow-
ment.org/fles/wp34.pdf, for a challenge to the notion that primary emphasis on the 
judiciary and judicial reform–as the nerve center of the rule of law–is appropriate while 
not addressing the perceived fairness of laws. 
173. See DIMITRY KOCHENOV, supra note 167, at 243–52 (2008), for the European Commission’s 
pre-accession assessments of candidate countries’ weaknesses in their judiciaries and 
the overwhelming scale of reforms required, which was noted in Commission reports 
during the accession process. See also Ganev, supra note 162, for a discussion of the 
serious defciencies of ex-socialist state judiciaries as erratic, sanctimonious, institution-
ally insulated, chronically dysfunctional, and strikingly ineffcient. 
174. See Elaine Weiner, Eastern Houses, Western Bricks? (Re)Constructing Gender Sensibilities
in the European Union’s Eastward Enlargement, 16 SOC. POL. 303, 303–04 (2009). 
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regarding sex equality by including a constitutional sex equality provision 
and any domestic anti-discrimination laws (often recently enacted in an-
ticipation of accession,175 either without any implementation provisions or 
with provisions which were not activated). Some states reported that they 
had established a gender unit176 to represent women’s interests in the state 
bureaucracy, to serve as a conduit for women’s rights NGOs to government 
agencies at different levels,177 and to promote women’s rights through a 
newly popular strategy of “gender mainstreaming.”178 
However, given the EU priority of candidate states’ conformity with the 
rules of a free market-based order, there were mixed signals regarding the 
de facto importance of sex equality in the accession package. Since the Eu-
ropean Commission reviewers of the accession submissions did not consult 
with NGOs,179 which arguably could have provided information regarding 
the states’ actual practices, candidate states were free to rely on Potemkin-
like strategic calculations to demonstrate their meeting EU conditionality: 
changes in formal law; bureaucratic expansion to include gender which, 
in most states, was window dressing developed by cynical bureaucrats 
and politicians;180 and reliance on gender mainstreaming rhetoric. That EU 
175. Galligan, supra note 69, at 137. 
176. “Parliamentary debates regarding the transposition of EU equality legislation were 
conducted in the context of a tradition of law where the notion of gender-based dis-
crimination is non-existent.” The Council of Europe (2001) defnes gender machineries 
as “an institutional governmental and, in some cases, parliamentary structure set up to 
promote women’s advancement and to ensure the full enjoyment by women of their 
human rights.” Id. at 44. 
177. In practice, gender units reproduced bureaucratic norms and practices and rarely in-
cluded women’s rights organizations in their work; NGO participation was reduced to 
formal consultative exercises; their opinions rarely fed even into the processes of policy 
formation. Id., at 148. 
178. Commission on the Status of Women, Follow-Up to the Fourth World Conference on 
Women: Review of Mainstreaming in the Organizations of the United Nations System, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/1997/2 (7 Feb. 1997), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ 
daw/csw/critical.htm. 
Gender mainstreaming is a policy process involving an assessment of the implications 
for women and men of any planned governmental action: legislation, policies and 
programmes in all areas and at all levels and, ultimately, for making women’s as well 
as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementa-
tion, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic 
and social spheres, so that inequality is not perpetuated. 
Critics claim that gender mainstreaming deploys the idea of gender in a very limited way 
and has allowed the mainstream to tame and deradicalize claims to gender equality. 
Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human 
Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2005). 
179. See Bozena Choluj & Claudia Neusuess, EU Enlargement in 2004: East-West Priorities and
Perspectives from Women Inside and Outside the EU, Discussion Paper, United Nations 
Development Fund for Women 4 (2004), available at http://www.claudia-neusuess.com/ 
uploads/Neusuess-Choluj-UNIFEM-neuPaper.pdf, for a discussion of Eastern European 
women’s rights NGOs’ perspectives on EU accession. 
180. In most accession states, the gender unit was short-lived as the political will in the national
parliament to support them was undercut by coalitions of backlash forces challenging 




   
 










        
 
member states were willing to be fexible meant—in practice, depending 
on the candidate country—that selective formal compliance could suffce181 
and that the European Union’s available leverage for promoting change at 
the accession stage was dissipated. 
In sum, in the more than two decades since these post-socialist states 
emerged, enthusiasm for law and legal system reform appears to have eroded
and has been replaced by skepticism, legal nihilism, or legal instrumental-
ism.182 Most post-socialist states still do not possess the capacity to compete 
with prevailing informal social norms,183 which are inconsistent with beliefs, 
attitudes, and actions essential to anchoring a rule of law culture.184 Public 
opinion in most post-socialist countries does not discern “connections . . . 
between the normativity of law and morality. . . . The normativity of law is 
perceived as a sort of convention covering at most a political game, hence, 
the attitude . . . that legal regulations entail dishonest intentions.”185 More-
over, endemic corruption in most post-socialist legal systems186 fuels popular
perception that the purported fairness of the legal system is yet another 
instance of offcial hypocrisy,187 now aided by lawyers in private practice 
in conjunction with the state. When legal system regime and output legiti-
mation are severely compromised, there is little incentive to affrmatively 
women’s rights as a key political agenda issue openly and in coded terms as well. As 
funding was cut and projects terminated, the vicious cycle of lackluster performance 
justifying further dismantling was accelerated. Galligan, supra note 69, at 148. 
181. MILADA ANNA VACHUDOVA, EUROPE UNDIVIDED: DEMOCRACY, LEVERAGE, AND INTEGRATION AFTER COM-
MUNISM 144 (2005). The proffered rationale was that, while not all Western European 
members of the EU initially had met the high standards associated with a liberal demo-
cratic order and European norms and principles, just as Western European states had 
moved along the spectrum towards greater if not full compliance by integrating them 
into domestic law, so too could and would post-socialist newcomers. Steven Greer & 
Andrew Williams, Human Rights in the Council of Europe and the EU: Towards “Indi-
vidual,” “Constitutional” or “Institutional” Justice? 15 EUR. L. J. 468 (2009). 
182. Marek Zirk-Sadowski, Transformation and Integration of Legal Cultures and Discourses— 
Poland, in SPREADING DEMOCRACY, supra note 101, at 307. 
183. Denis Galligan, Legal Failure: Law and Social Norms in Post-Communist Europe, in
LAW AND INFORMAL PRACTICES: THE POST-COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 2–4 (Denis J. Galligan & Marina 
Kurkchiyan eds., 2003). 
184. See, e.g., Ausra Raulickyte, Lithuania’s Courts and the Rule of Law, 2 J. BALTIC STUD. 182 
(2001). Despite court reforms, societal attitudes towards courts and judges remain quite 
negative (citing survey results)—a residue of the Soviet past. Id. at 186–87. 
185. Zirk-Sadowski, supra note 182, at 307. 
186. Clientelistic networks, the pattern of opportunities in the region, and the growing nor-
malization of corruption involving a network of social relations where personal loyalty 
to the patron prevails against market relations, democratic decision making and profes-
sionalism in public bureaucracies, go hand in hand. Sajó, Corruption, Clientelism, supra
note 159, at 37–46. Also see Ivan Krastev, Corruption, Anti-Corruption Sentiments and 
the Rule of Law, in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM, supra note 154, at 323, 
for the claim that corruption has replaced repression as the main obstacle to the rule 
of law in the region. 
187. Tismaneanu, supra note 100, at 38. 














protect citizens from violations of their rights, especially controversial ones, 
notwithstanding a state’s obligation to do so. 
One reasonable response to the pessimistic assessment outlined above is
that, given the powerful legacies of socialism, slightly more than two decades
is an inadequate interval in which to achieve the deep changes necessary 
to generate law and legal system legitimation at regime and output levels. 
Each sovereign post-socialist state still lacks resources and a suffciently large
pool of legal system personnel able to implement new laws and develop 
appropriate legal practices.188 NGO lawyers with whom I have worked report
that judges, as well as lawyers, tend to have limited training in regional and 
international jurisprudence and lack access to sites that could assist them. 
Judges may simply apply the text of national law because it is the only thing 
they know with certainty. 
As I have been told on numerous occasions, several more generations 
must retire or die off before signifcant changes can be fully and effectively 
implemented. What is often ignored or unrecognized in such conversations is
the conterminous pressing need for the reform of legal education (discussed 
in IV(B) below) in order to begin to produce lawyers, legal system person-
nel, and academics who are equipped to address existing and anticipatable 
twenty-frst century human rights issues including women’s rights at domestic,
regional, and international levels. Mere generational turnover in the legal 
system or the academy will not suffce if newcomers merely reproduce past 
attitudes and behaviors. 
2. Anchoring Constitutionalism through Constitutional Courts 
At the apex of a state’s legal system, the constitutional court, a relative new-
comer to European civil law countries,189 is a crucial institution for the norma-
tive building of a democratic, law-based state.190 Charged with interpreting 
188. See, e.g., MILIEU LTD., COMPARATIVE STUDY ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN GENERAL EQUALITY AND ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAW (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/fles/ 
conference_sept_2011/fnal_report_access_to_justice_fnal_en.pdf, an extensive report 
that includes, among its best practices recommendations, prioritizing the training and 
education of relevant professionals. Id. at 64–66. The report recommends that the Com-
mission continue to fnance the training for judges, legal practitioners, and academics. 
Id. at 66 (emphasis added). 
189. The frst Constitutional Courts were created in 1920 in Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
and disbanded in 1938. The Austrian Court was re-established in 1945. The German 
Court was established in 1951; the French Constitutional Council was formed in 1958. 
During socialist times, only Poland had a constitutional tribunal (established in 1986) 
with authority to review legal acts for conformity with its constitution. 
190. Constitutional courts defy the principle that statutory law is the only and ultimate sources
of law. They have developed a system of constitutional law using precedents as a source 
of law and with constitutional rules that may determine the normative framework of the 
law-based state. PŘIBÁŇ, DISSIDENTS OF LAW, supra note 125, at 97. 








       
 
 




   
 
 
      
 
   
the state constitution by providing an independent191 review of legislation and
offcial practices, this court has a vital role in each post-socialist state’s law 
and legal system legitimation efforts.192 Unlike post-WWII Western European
constitutional courts, which were symbols of legal continuity, constitutional 
courts in post-socialist states have not only had to legitimate their own exis-
tence, they also have had to address a panoply of new tasks: the annihilation 
of the old socialist legal paradigm,193 the creation of a new tradition and 
the cultivation of faith in the new normative order,194 and the resolution of 
tension between a legal order and a dramatically changing political order 
in which the impulse for sweeping change has to be constitutionalized.195 
The almost two decade record of constitutional courts in the region 
suggests that many of them have not been able to fulfll the expectations 
placed on them.196 There are, of course, some country specifc reasons for this
situation. However, there is also an overarching reason posing an apparent 
institutional dilemma that is connected more generally to the legitimation of 
post-socialist legal systems. An assertive constitutional court that, following 
a rule of law, declares laws enacted by parliament unconstitutional opens 
itself to a politically potent accusation of countermanding prevailing popu-
lar political beliefs. These include: a strong central government limited by 
“parliamentary checks, the protection of rights principally or solely through 
positive legislation, and a more modest political and social role for lawyers.”197 
If the constitutional court appears either to be overriding the popular will 
expressed by a democratically elected parliament or protecting rights with-
out specifc positive legislation,198 it can be labeled a counter-majoritarian, 
and, thus, an anti-democratic institution.199 It then risks one of several high 
191. See Smilov, EU Enlargement, supra note 170, at 313, for a discussion of different East 
European models for the implementation of the principle of judicial independence. 
192. See RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM, supra note 154, at 297–303, for extensive 
discussions of constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe. 
193. Kühn, Post-Communist Judiciaries, supra note 127, at 194. 
194. Venelin I. Ganev, Foxes, Hedgehogs, and Learning: Notes on the Past and Future Dilem-
mas of Postcommunist Constitutionalism, in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM, 
supra note 154, at 75. 
195. Id. 
196. See PUCHALSKA, supra note 138, at 125–45, for a critical analysis of the record of constitu-
tional courts—more specifcally—the Polish Constitutional Court in the constitutionalism-
democracy balance of the post-socialist state. But see Sergio Bartole, Conclusions: 
Legitimacy of Constitutional Courts: Between Policy Making and Legal Science, in
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST 426 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002), for examples of 
Polish, Czech, and Slovenian constitutional courts going beyond a formalistic exegesis 
of the legal texts. 
197. DeLisle, supra note 158, at 290. 
198. See Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutional Courts and Constitutional Cultures in Central and 
Eastern European Countries, in CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AFTER TRANSITION, supra note 143, 
at 99, for a discussion of the impact of constitutional courts upon constitutional culture 
in their relationship with other branches of government–particularly legislatures. 
199. See Sarah Wright Sheive, Central and Eastern Europe Constitutional Courts and the 
Anti-majoritarian Objection to Judicial Review, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1201, 1218–24 
(1995), for a discussion of strategies to minimize the anti-majoritarian objection in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
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stakes parliamentary responses—approval of the unconstitutional law, refusal
to comply with the court’s decision, or revision of the constitution. Each of 
these options has a potential impact on the legitimation of the constitutional 
court and, ultimately, on the legitimation of an admittedly weakly legitimated
post-socialist legal system. 
Consequently, in states with relatively fresh memories of decades of 
totalitarian rule and the legacy of a compromised delegitimated socialist 
legal system, a judicious constitutional court, rather than moving forward to 
declare a law unconstitutional, may prefer to wait for parliament to interpret 
a constitutional provision and then itself become a parliamentary rubber 
stamp. This suggests that a constitutional court may be less valued if, after 
due deliberation, it comes to its own opposite conclusion. Admittedly, there 
is more than a whiff of irony in this proposition. The lack of legal system 
independence is again rationalized200—albeit, now, in a post-socialist demo-
cratic context, rather than a socialist one. 
This outcome has implications for the European jurisprudential propo-
sition of subsidiarity—that domestic courts should be the lynchpins of 
the European human rights system charged with protecting the European 
Convention’s rights and freedoms,201 and that decisions involving European 
rights issues are best made at the lower levels of state government rather 
than at a supranational level. To the extent that there are major internal 
political, legal, and cultural incentives for a domestic legal system to avoid 
addressing certain human rights issues, such as women’s rights—even though
most post-socialist legal systems are based on monist assimilation models202 
incorporating a state’s international and regional human rights obligations 
including women’s rights into domestic law—the depth of a state’s com-
mitment to a rule of law within the multi-layered European human rights 
system is open to question. State resistance can be compounded by the fact 
that a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg does 
not nullify state legislation or practices, but rather identifes the grounds for 
concluding that the state has violated its obligations under the European 
Convention. A petitioner’s victory at the supranational regional level does not
preclude a state’s failure to execute the judgment. In fact, a state’s waiting 
200. See Michal Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the Mental Transitions of 
the Central European Judiciaries, 14 EUR. PUB. L. 99 (2008). 
201. European Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221, Eur. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1953). 
202. Kühn, Worlds Apart, supra note 131, at 562. Other options for connecting international 
human rights law to domestic law are supplementation–by explicit or implicit consti-
tutional directive–or adaptation–blending or hybridizing of international with domestic 
law through the process of interpretation. Ruth Rubio-Marin & Martha I. Morgan, Con-
stitutional Domestication of International Gender Norms: Categorizations, Illustrations, 
and Refections from the Nearside of the Bridge, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 115 (Karen 
Knop ed., 2004). 









      
  
 
game may be a good domestic political move203 —leaving the prevailing 
party to have to turn for possible redress to a hitherto inattentive political 
entity, the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe,204 whose failure 
to act can be said to perpetuate rights violations. 
In sum, women’s rights–like other identity-based rights considered con-
troversial by powerful domestic political, cultural, and legal forces discussed
in Section II(B)–are a lightning rod that test a state’s commitment to consti-
tutionalism, a rule of law, and its regional and international human rights 
obligations. In theory, fulflling these three commitments should assist in the 
legitimation of its legal system at regime and output levels; paradoxically, 
however, such diligent efforts may backfre. 
3. Legal Positivism, Feminist Legal Theory, and the Interpretation of 
Law 
The preceding two sections (III(B)(1) and (2)), which focus on the two key 
features contributing to post-socialist role of law and rule of law developments
with mixed consequences for legal system regime and output legitimation, do
not exhaust the explanation of contestations over the legitimacy of women’s 
rights in a reformed post-socialist legal order. Of equal importance, though 
admittedly less likely to be acknowledged, is the extent to which the prevail-
ing philosophical approach to the interpretation of law in post-socialist legal 
systems assists in the delegitimation of existing women’s rights jurisprudence. 
No longer bound and isolated by socialist law and legality,205 post so-
cialist legal systems rely on legal positivism, the prevailing jurisprudential 
philosophy of European civil law systems, in their interpretation and ap-
plication of law. Not surprisingly, law faculties teach law from a positivist 
perspective (discussed further in Section IV(B)(1) below). 
203. See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Alan Green, Legitimacy and the Future of the European 
Court of Human Rights: Critical Perspectives from Academia and Practitioners, 12 GER-
MAN L. J. 1707 (2011). 
204. See Marinella Marmo, The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights – A Political Battle, 15 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 235 (2008), for a discussion 
of states failing to comply with the Court’s judgments within the required three-month 
period and a discussion of the principle of solidarity aiming to enlarge the effect of the 
court’s rulings to all member states. If a case is heard by the Court of Justice of the EU 
in Luxembourg, the remedy for state non-compliance with a judgment is not more ef-
fective. Also see INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE BEYOND CONDITIONALITY: POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE AFTER
EU ENLARGEMENT (Rachel A. Epstein & Ulrich Sedelmeier eds., 2009), for a discussion of 
political conditionality (democratic principles, human rights, and minority rights), in 
which EU institutions do not have any sanctioning power, except in extreme cases of a 
“serious and persistent breach” of democracy and fundamental rights. Under Article 7 
of the EU treaty, certain membership rights then can be suspended. 
205. Socialism could enforce its own interests freely with brutal force through unlawful 
interference or even through silencing the law. Kühn, Worlds Apart, supra note 131, at 
5–10. 
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One of legal positivism’s basic premises is that law is a science—a 
highly developed form of rationality. It is analytically reducible to a logi-
cally coherent autonomous system of more or less deterministic rules that 
are independent of moral, economic, and political theory; these rules are 
used to control society.206 Consistent with notions of law as a science, these 
rules are abstracted from the particularities of their socio historical context. 
In effect, “law is a self-referential system which obtains m—obtaining its 
authority from itself.”207 Law sets up standards, said to be applied in a neutral
manner to formally equal parties. It maintains its neutrality and objectivity 
by its enunciation of legal truths.208 
Enacted by the sovereign–the parliament in modern democracies–, laws 
are presumed to be clear, complete, and coherent—meaning that there is 
a mutual relationship between legal rules.209 To a signifcant degree, the 
presumption of the legal text’s linguistic correctness guarantees its judicial 
reading in accordance with the legislators’ intent.210 
Courts adhering to a positivist approach based on explicit rules are 
likely to rely on technical modes of legal reasoning by directly applying 
a formally valid code provision as the binding objective source of law to 
produce a narrow, literal judicial interpretation of law. “[I]n hard cases, 
where an easy logical syllogism cannot be applied . . . judges do not need 
to listen to precedents, legal writings, the intention of the legislature, [or] 
the rationally reconstructed purposes of the law.”211 They also can rely on 
the unwritten principle “when in doubt do nothing.”212 
Of course, legal positivism, like other philosophies of jurisprudence, is 
not monolithic. Among its adherents, there is contestation213 regarding the 
relative merits and failings of a hard–traditional or exclusive–positivism, a 
soft–inclusive–positivism,214 or critical legal positivism.215 The latter two ap-
206. See Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054 (1995), for a 
discussion of the assumption that positivism is inherently conservative. 
207. Margaret Thornton, Among the Ruins: Law in the Neo-Liberal Academy, 20 WINDSOR
Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3 (2001). 
208. PŘIBÁŇ, DISSIDENTS OF LAW, supra note 125, at 64–75. 
209. KAARLO TUORI, CRITICAL LEGAL POSITIVISM 7 (2002). 
210. Zirk-Sadowski, supra note 182, at 310. 
211. Kühn, Worlds Apart, supra note 131, at 558. 
212. PUCHALSKA, supra note 138, at 137. 
213. PŘIBÁŇ, DISSIDENTS OF LAW, supra note 125, at 69–75. Also see Tom Campbell, Democratic 
Aspects of Ethical Positivism, in JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 29, at 3, for a discussion of 
the intellectual and empirical problems of legal positivism. 
214. See Matthew Grellette, Legal Positivism and the Separation of Existence and Validity, 
23 RATIO JURIS 622 (2010), for a discussion of “inclusive legal positivism,” which claims 
that standards of political morality are included in attempts to determine the existence, 
content, and meaning of valid laws without collapsing into a version of natural-law 
theory, rather than assuming connections between law and morality are only contingent. 
215. See TUORI, supra note 209. See also Helen Stacy, Positivism and Difference, in JUDICIAL
POWER, supra note 29, at 139; Lacey, supra note 29, at 94–99. 








     
proaches seek to remedy the failings of the hard version, which does not 
recognize the cultural and communicative character of law and its actual 
impact. 
Here, post-socialist legal systems appear to be caught in a dilemma. 
On the one hand, given the socialist legacy of deeply compromised and 
delegitmated law and legal systems, contemporary judicial reliance on hard 
legal positivism, which allows legal institutions to function under conditions 
of very limited discretion, may be reassuring. State commitments to judicial 
independence can be said to be honored when judges decide cases only
according to law. But this claim is misleading, as law always involves inter-
pretation of text, even if one claims law’s alleged clarity and certainty and 
disregards contradictions and indeterminacy in legal doctrines.216 Moreover, 
there are costs to reliance on hard positivism’s formalist approach. Formal 
legality risks degeneration into excessive formalism and textualism,217 which 
hampers the capacity of the legal system either to take new interests or cir-
cumstances into account or to remedy the de facto effects of social inequal-
ity. Arguably, then, post-socialist progress toward enhanced legitimation of 
law and the legal system at regime and output levels may be hindered by a 
traditionally oriented legal system’s failure to recognize issues and provide 
meaningful redress, for example, for rights violations. 
How do women’s rights fare in post-socialist legal systems relying on 
prevailing legal positivist approaches to the interpretation of law? In all 
likelihood, they fare poorly in courts and, as discussed in Section IV(B), in 
law faculties as well. In a sex/gender discrimination case, a court that is 
committed to hard positivism can invoke a state constitution’s sex equality 
provision to fnd no discrimination. If a general sex equality law, even one 
lacking any implementation provisions, is found to be consistent with that 
constitutional provision, a court may fnd no discrimination. Even if that 
state’s constitution also contains a monist provision that incorporates binding
regional and international obligations into state law, a court may ignore it. 
If a court concludes that a specifc law is de jure facially consistent with a 
constitutional sex equality provision or general sex equality law and fails to 
consider allegations of its de facto disparate and, arguably, discriminatory 
impact, it may well fnd no discrimination. In any of these situations, the 
court is ignoring the close connections among power relations generated 
by sex and gender,218 often combined with other variables such as race, 
216. Lacey, supra note 29. 
217. Kühn, Worlds Apart, supra note 131, at 532. 
218. “The goal of the substantive equality is to transform social patterns of discrimination, 
partly by uncovering the inequalities in gender neutral laws and partly by challenging 
schemes that differentiate women by offering  . . . only paternalistic benefts.” Beverly 
Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin, Introduction: Toward a Feminist Constitutional Agenda, in
THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 14 (Beverly Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 
2005). 








       
 
          
 




ethnicity, class, or sexual orientation, that produce discrimination. To further 
complicate matters, if layers of law are involved, a hard positivist approach 
may be inadequate.219 For example, a court may be tasked with reconciling 
an anti-discrimination law with a gender-neutral provision in another law 
or regulation while also trying to take into consideration EU, regional, or 
international jurisprudence about which it has little or no knowledge and 
training. 
Feminist legal theory, associated with critical legal theory, provides a 
sharp contrast and an alternative to most prevailing versions of legal positiv-
ism—though one may be correct in assuming that judges are unaware of its 
existence. Feminist legal theory questions and renders problematic what is 
conventionally designated as the objective, the neutral, and the normal. By 
claiming that knowledge regarding the sexes is always socially situated,220 it 
challenges positivism’s foundational claim of law’s objectivity and neutral-
ity as an autonomous system and recognizes that “[l]egal texts are almost 
always written in an objective and discursive style from a position of a legal 
authority or expert that masks their discursive and constructive nature.”221 
In a sexually patterned world, women and men are not formal legal sub-
jects; they are not abstracted from social context, as legal positivism would 
have it. Sex/gender ideologies, whose hegemonic standards of naturalized 
and normalized masculinity and femininity are incorporated into law, are 
interpreted and enforced by law.222 
Like other schools of socio legal analysis, feminist legal theory’s criti-
cisms of analytical (positivist) jurisprudence demystify legal doctrine, legal 
discourse, and law’s understanding of itself.223 Like other critical legal theo-
rists, feminist legal theorists maintain that law does not transcend its location.
Rather, law is a mechanism likely to refect, reproduce, express, construct, 
and reinforce prevailing sexually patterned power relations in the world wide
system of fraternal patriarchy that privileges or accommodates the needs of 
men.224 Consequently, a de jure approach in a sex discrimination case will 
simply reproduce that power disparity. In contrast, a de facto contextualized 
determination of the actual harmful impact of a law recognizes those whose 
lives are concretely affected by it. 
219. Oral Communication from Janka Debrecienova, a women’s rights lawyer from Bratislava,
Slovakia. 
220. V. SPIKE PETERSON & ANNE SISSON RUNYAN, GLOBAL GENDER ISSUES 24 (1999). 
221. Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Päivi Honkatukia & Minna Ruuskanen, Legal Texts as Dis-
courses, in EXPLOITING THE LIMITS OF LAW: SWEDISH FEMINISM AND THE CHALLENGE TO PESSIMISM 69, 
81 (Åsa Gunnarsson et al. eds., 2007). 
222. Lacey, supra note 29, at 108. 
223. PŘIBÁŇ, DISSIDENTS OF LAW, supra note 125, at 80–81. 
224. Joanne Conaghan, Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Perspective in Law, 27 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 351 (2000). 













   
 
IV. LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
IN THE CURRICULUM 
A. Socialist State-Controlled Legal Education 
In their frst edict after assuming power, the Bolsheviks abolished the entire 
pre-revolutionary legal system, including the bar.225 Law faculties were closed
for two years; social science faculties were charged with educating whatever
legal professionals were needed;226 the practice of law was opened to “all 
honest persons of either sex who enjoy civil rights.”227 When a limited num-
ber of law faculties did reopen, they were subject to tight state control—a 
familiar pattern from the Tsarist past. 
By the second decade of the socialist era, as socialist laws and the 
concept of socialist legality were more fully developed in the Soviet Union, 
references to European civil law systems were eliminated from the law cur-
riculum. Compulsory ideological education–the History of the Communist 
Party, Political Economy, Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, and Scientifc Com-
munism–228 and participation in the Komsomol–Communist party youth 
organization–were added as requirements. 
In post-WWII socialist countries, the existing civil law system was re-
placed by a socialist one; many of its principles and norms were imported 
from the USSR.229 A purge of each national bar commenced, and the num-
ber of lawyers was radically reduced.230 State controlled law faculties were 
225. See JOHN N. HAZARD, SETTLING DISPUTES IN SOVIET SOCIETY: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
1–9 (1960), for a discussion of the dismantling of Tsarist legal structures. According to 
Marxist theory, law is part of the superstructure of society; its content and purposes are 
determined by a society’s economic base. Law, thus, is a tool for the reinforcement of 
ruling class dominance. In a utopian, classless, communist society, Marx proclaimed, 
law and the legal system would be unnecessary and would wither away as would legal 
education. G. M. Razi, Legal Education and the Role of the Lawyer in the Soviet Union 
and the Countries of Eastern Europe, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 776, 784 (1960). 
226. See Razi, supra note 225, at 783, for a brief discussion of the period 1917–1921, when 
the Revolutionary Tribunals and Cheka were the dominant organs for the administration 
of justice and operated according to principles of “the revolutionary conscience and 
the revolutionary concept of justice”—thus limiting the need for legal education. 
227. Meyer, supra note 67, at 1023. Initially, admission of children of the former bourgeoisie 
and the intelligentsia to institutions of higher learning was terminated, though this ban 
was later rescinded.
228. Anna Smolentseva, Challenges to the Russian Academic Profession, 45 HIGHER ED. 391, 
393 (2003). Compulsory courses in scientifc communism created problems of ideolo-
gization of the higher education process. Id. at 395. 
229. Confict between the party system and the Romanist-oriented members of the legal 
profession in parts of East Central Europe existed. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW, 
supra note 124, at 118–26. 
230. Meyer, supra note 67, at 1028. See also Razi, supra note 225, at 799, n.80. 



















required to adopt an ideologically vetted, Soviet inspired law curriculum,231 
as well as to institute class-based232 or party-based233 admission quotas. New 
socialist law texts were written in national languages; Soviet law texts often 
were used as supplements or references.234 That socialist law and the social-
ist legal system were superior to common or civil law states, whose legal 
systems hypocritically espoused liberal democratic principles while being 
subservient to capitalist interests, was an ideological given. 
Socialist legal education produced cadres of jurists–offcials and profes-
sors at the highest level who prepared laws–and rank and fle legal work-
ers–judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. Like all education, it was connected 
to the state’s employment system, which usually assigned jobs to graduating 
law students.235 
Like other university faculties, law faculties experienced varying degrees
of party/state organized repression, depending on external political develop-
ments.236 That said, even when, in post-Stalinist times, a few East Central 
European jurists developed rejuvenated concepts of justice within socialist 
legality,237 in most socialist countries, the space for intellectual inquiry in 
law faculties remained extremely limited.238 Citizens’ obligations to the state 
and society were emphasized rather than their rights. 
231. Razi, supra note 225, at 789–90. 
232. Fodor, Power, Patriarchy, and Paternalism, supra note 42, at 53–54. In Hungary, for 
example, the quota–originally 50 percent for children of the working class–was later 
reduced to 30 percent. 
233. In the Soviet Union, in addition to a high score on entrance examinations, a recom-
mendation from the Communist Youth Organization was required. For the prestigious 
faculties at Moscow and Leningrad, strong Community party connections were offcially 
required. Lisa A. Granik, Legal Education in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, 73 OR. L. 
REV. 963, 964 n.3 (1993). 
234. Schönfelder, supra note 135, at 77–81. Law texts referred to “the teachers of the offcial 
philosophy of the Soviet state as often as possible to prove that they expound[ed] the 
subject matter according to the Orthodox views of Marxism-Leninism and that reality 
fts into theory, so as to obtain the imprimatur of the authorities.” Razi, supra note 225, 
at 782. It was not unusual to see treatises dedicated to the reviewers from the Ministry 
of Education who “perfected the scientifc accuracy of the work.” Id. at 783. 
235. In some states, they might be able to express employment preferences, but in most states,
they had to work at an assigned position for a period of time before seeking positions 
elsewhere. Granik, supra note 233, at 972. 
236. See PIANA, supra note 156156, at 106–09, for a discussion of the extent to which Polish 
legal education maintained a greater degree of intellectual integrity than Czechoslovak 
and Hungarian legal education. Also see Edi Spaho, Dire Straits: Albanian Legal Edu-
cation, 9 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 90 (2000), for a discussion of the extreme repression in 
Albania. 
237. MIECZYSLAW MANELI, JURIDICAL POSITIVISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 128–64 (1981). 
238. Higher education in the region generally was marked by a “passive nature and sub-
ordination to the functions of offcial ideology and a centrally planned economy . . . 
guaranteeing a minimal set of social benefts and a stable and predictable (life).” Igor 
V. Kitaev, Russian Education in Transition: Transformation of Labour Market, Attitudes of 
Youth and Changes in Management of Higher and Lifelong Education, 20 OXFORD REV. 
EDUC. 111,113 (1994).
















   
     
 
    
Law professors taught from legal texts without providing any critical 
analysis.239 Precedent was rejected as antithetical to the principle of demo-
cratic centralism;240 other considerations, such as the effcacy of rules, their 
impact, the policy surrounding them, judicial decisions, customary practices,
or established conventions, were disregarded.241 Statutory interpretation was 
not a subject of study.242 Since law was presented as a simple cognitive 
operation, discussions of legal methodology were rare.243 
Pedagogical methods in law faculties reproduced the authoritarian and 
culturally endorsed pattern of a strong hierarchical relationship between 
faculty as experts and students as disciples. Professors relied on an ex ca-
thedra pedagogy consisting of lectures on the texts and the memorization of 
codes; exams, oral or written, were based on memorization of legal theories,
history, and specifc code provisions. 
Libraries, a potential source for critical thinking, usually were not directly
accessible to students. Foreign book collections were skimpy and, depending
on the country and period, these books might not be available for circulation.
Moreover, since students and faculty were fuent in their national language 
and in Russian (a compulsory subject), they were less likely to be able to 
read foreign materials that offered a different perspective on law and legal 
systems and that, lacking offcial approval, were not translated into their 
mother tongue or Russian. 
In most socialist states, legal education did not have the status associated
with other disciplines, which trained workers to make concrete contribu-
tions to the further development of socialism.244 Consequently, the legal 
profession was not widely represented in the higher echelons of the party 
or the state apparatus in many socialist states. The legal profession “had a 
marginalized role in social affairs and development . . . reduced to solving 
petty civil matters and dealing with criminality issues.”245 
239. Textual and positivist analysis of legal texts were the only way to evade the omnipresent 
ideology of scarcely readable works relying on political propaganda to demonstrate the 
superiority of socialist law. Kühn, Comparative Law, supra note 161, at 227. 
240. Kühn, Worlds Apart, supra note 131, at 542. 
241. Id. at 540. 
242. Id. at 542. 
243. Id. at 543. 
244. It is estimated that, in some countries, only six to ten percent of all law graduates became
advokats. Others entered the state apparatus directly or became jurisconsults. Meyer, 
supra note 67, at 1035. 
245. Mariana Berbec–Rostas, Arkady Gutnikov & Barbara Namyslowska-Gabrysiak, Clinical 
Legal Education in Central and Eastern Europe: Selected Case Studies, in THE GLOBAL
CLINICAL MOVEMENT: EDUCATING LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 53–54 (Frank S. Bloch ed., 2001). 
Criminal defense counsel operated under state-imposed constraints designed to undercut
the delivery of an effective representation of their clients. ROBERT RAND, COMRADE LAWYER
33 (1991). 




        








B. Legal Education in Post-Socialist States 
1. Post-Socialist Teaching of Law 
With the collapse of socialism, universities in the region were freed from 
intrusive state control. Their governance and institutional operations would 
be guided by liberal democratic principles—academic freedom, autonomy, 
self-governance, and respect for human rights.246 In law faculties, the most 
immediate curriculum reform entailed substantive shifts as civil law subjects 
replaced socialist law ones and new subjects relating to the introduction of 
market economies and, later, to the European Union were added. 
Despite the relatively weak legitimation of law and legal systems at 
regime and output levels (discussed in Section III(B)), there now appears to 
be an increased interest in the study of law and a higher status attached to 
lawyers than in the socialist past. This shift may be based on the prospect of 
expanded opportunities and attractive salaries for some lawyers, especially 
multi-lingual ones, in commercial and corporate law practices—at times 
connected with Western European or North American law frms.247 For 
those hoping to enter the state bureaucracy, law training provides economic 
security in perilous times.248 
246. Helle Blomquist, Legal Education, Profession, and Society Transition: Reform of Lithu-
anian Legal Education, 29 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L.35, 44 (2004). See Olga Bain, Education 
After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: The End of History or the Beginning of Histories, in
POST-SOCIALISM IS NOT DEAD: (RE)READING THE GLOBAL IN COMPARATIVE EDUCATION 27, 28 (Iveta 
Slivova ed., 2010), for a discussion of the goals of deideologization, depoliticization, 
destatization, and decentralization as offcial educational reform objectives or–phrased 
as a constructive agenda– diversifcation, differentiation, humanization, and humani-
tarianization. Educators in post-socialist countries participated in the Bologna Process, 
which envisioned the creation of a European Higher Education Area in undergraduate 
and graduate education by 2010 through coordination of their higher education policies 
based on principles of autonomy and diversity. There was not much discussion about 
substantive curriculum reform. See Lusine Hovhannisian, Clinical Legal Education and 
the Bologna Process, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW INITIATIVE PAPERS, NO. 2 (2006), available at http:// 
www.pilnet.org/component/docman/doc_download/25-clinical-legal-education-and-the-
bologna-process.html. Unfortunately, a number of expectations, generated in the early 
years of the process, have not been met. 
247. See Stephan Heidenhain, The Legal Profession in the Czech Republic (2008), available 
at http://www.osce.org/odihr/36296; Márta Pardavi, The Legal Professional in Hun-
gary (2008), available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/36305; Adam Bodnar & Dominika 
Bychawska, The Legal Profession in Poland (2009), available at http://www.osce.org/ 
odihr/36308; Dmitry Shabelnikov, The Legal Profession in the Russian Federation (2008),
available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/36312; Vasili Kukharchyk & Maryana Kulya, The 
Legal Profession in Ukraine (2008), available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/3631, for a 
discussion of the country-specifc organization of legal practice..
248. For example, as in the socialist era, the majority of contemporary lower court judges 
are women. In many countries, the judiciary remains largely a low paying, secure bu-
reaucratic career option. Galligan, supra note 69, at 44. However, depending on the 
country, the salary may be quite high when compared to other income levels. 


















State university law faculties continue to provide free or low cost educa-
tion for the overwhelming majority of future legal professionals. Based on 
their access to the best and brightest students selected through a competitive 
state exam,249 these faculties enjoy intellectual preeminence in the trans-
mission of legal elite culture.250 However, in the region’s neo-liberal market 
oriented economies, they have been beggared by a lack of public fnancial 
resources251 or foreign assistance.252 
To meet the increased demand for legal education, private (proprietary) 
law schools have been established.253 An undetermined percentage of them 
are considered “degree mills”—offering a degree for a price to intellectually 
unqualifed or less qualifed students.254 At this point, they do not appear to 
be serious competitors to prestigious state university faculties. 
Generally speaking, in the region, law remains a deeply conservative 
academic discipline.255 Law is taught from a legal positivist standpoint, 
which does not encourage or reward challenges or critiques of existing 
legal authority or texts.256 “Available textbooks summarize codes and avoid 
issues of interpretation and construction. . . . Critical reviews of judicial 
opinions are much less frequently found than in West European civil law 
countries.”257 In the wake of neo-liberalism and globalization in the region, 
249. The Ministry of Education in each country sets the number of entering students. Peter 
J. Sahlas & Carl Chastenay, Russian Legal Education: Post-Communist Stagnation or 
Revival? 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 194, 213 (1998). 
250. TUORI, supra note 209, at 166. 
251. To diversify and increase their revenue stream, some state university law faculties have 
been permitted to admit an additional number of fee-paying students with lower exam 
scores. Snejana Slantcheva, The Bulgarian Academic Profession in Transition, 45 HIGHER
EDUC. 425, 427 (2003). 
252. Although the US government has supported “rule of law” projects as part of earlier law 
and development initiatives in other parts of the world and integrated legal education 
reform into overall legal reform initiatives, in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, legal education reform has been at most a tangential part of ongoing United 
States-funded legal reform projects though it is fundamental to promoting the rule of 
law. Mark K. Dietrich & Nicolas Mansfeld, Lessons Spurned: Legal Education in the 
Age of Democracy Promotion 1–2 (2006), available at http://ewmi.org/sites/ewmi.org/ 
fles/fles/EWMILegalEducationReform.pdf. 
253. It is estimated that 271 law schools were operating in Russia in 2004; only 108 were 
accredited. In 1986, there were only 100 state-run law schools. WILLIAM BURNHAM, PETER B. 
MAGGS & GENNADY M. DANILENKO, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 133–34 
(3d ed. 2004). 
254. Private law schools usually rely on underpaid state university law professors who 
supplement their low incomes by giving lectures to private law faculty students. See, 
e.g., Sahlas & Chastenay, supra note 249, at 202. 
255. Parochial, outmoded positivist simple textual approaches continue to exist in academia. 
Kühn, Post-Communist Judiciaries, supra note 127, at 198. 
256. There are crippling effects if, as happens, the professor has drafted the law code and 
will be offended if the student says anything other than repeating the content of the 
class lecture. Blomquist, supra note 246, at 72. 
257. Schönfelder, supra note 135, at 84–85. 
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legal education is valued for facilitating the operation of the market as the 
quintessential sphere of freedom and economic well-being.258 That law can 
work toward the promotion of change consistent with human rights principles
such as equality, democracy, diversity, and social justice does not appear as 
a prominent theme or incentive. 
Despite growing demands on the legal profession, the quality of legal 
education does not appear to have improved substantially. In state and most 
private law school faculties, classes are large. Many professors still rely on 
an ex cathedra (lecture) format,259 which tends to reproduce the status quo 
as authoritative knowledge.260 Students still transcribe and memorize the 
information conveyed by professors in their lectures for fnal exams.261 
Some lecture courses may have large discussion sections labeled as 
seminars. These seminars are conducted by overburdened young assistants 
serving as legal academic apprentices.262 Usually, there is very limited op-
portunity for in-depth critical discussion. Free standing seminars that require 
original research or extensive supplemental reading are rather rare. 
Opportunities for legal, practice-oriented educational experiences are 
not only limited by a lack of resources, but also by prevailing pedagogical 
258. Thornton, The Demise of Diversity in Legal Education, supra note 121, at 38. 
259. Pedagogy in the region is infuenced by German traditions. Defenders of this format 
claim that the civil law system is more coherent and organized than the common law 
system, “allowing students to master positive law and understand the internal logic of 
the legal system rather than taking a chaotic overview of the resolution of particular 
problems” as justifcations for lectures rather than interactive and creative teaching 
methods. Sahlas & Chastenay, supra note 249, at 209. 
260. “[T]he dialogic act of learning by rediscovering existing knowledge is not the same as the
one-way transference of knowledge that takes place in traditional education. [Like the 
creation of new knowledge, it, too] must be predicated on critical refection, curiosity, 
problematisation, uncertainty and creativity.” Dianne Otto, Handmaidens, Hierarchies 
and Crossing the Public-Private Divide in the Teaching of International Law, 1 MELB. J. 
INT’L L. 35, 41 (2000). 
261. “The best students [are] those who remember the maximum amount of formalized in-
formation . . . (though) they might not understand very well how it applies to practical 
situations.” Daniil E. Fedorchuk, Fighting Dragons of the Past: The Internationalization 
of Legal Education at Donetsk National University, in THE EXPORT OF LEGAL EDUCATION: ITS
PROMISE AND IMPACT IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES 45, 48 (Ronald A. Brand & D. Wes Rist eds., 
2009). 
[T]he educator’s responsibility is to prepare an outline of core materials (especially, the main rules 
of relevant statutes) in condensed form in the lecture. . . . If case law is mentioned, usually only 
a short overview is provided without any recourse to the facts or factors which infuenced the 
judgment or comparison to other judgments involving similar circumstances. 
(The exception is Court of Justice of the EU and ECtHR cases.) Id. at 49. “Students 
normally are discouraged from going beyond the outline.” Id. at 50. Extra information 
is not required to pass the exam, “and teachers themselves are often unaware of such 
information.” Id. 
262. Assistants are vulnerable to discrimination and to mobbing by professors. Ana Covic, 
who works in the Offce of the Ombudsperson in Novi Sad, Serbia, provided this infor-
mation. 









assumptions that law professors disseminate theory to students and that law 
faculties should not be tasked with preparing future lawyers for practical 
work.263 Consequently, clinical legal education, which focuses on skills, is 
uncommon in the law curriculum in most countries.264 If internships are 
available, they usually consist of students’ passive observation of court ses-
sions or a law practice. 
2. Stakeholders in Legal Education Reform 
The discussion in this section is grounded on the reasonable assumption 
that, in the near future, law faculties are likely to face greater pressures to 
modernize by undertaking more expansive reforms, especially as socialist 
trained generations of faculty and administrators retire. This article begins 
with a more general analysis of faculty participation in a broad reform pro-
cess. It is followed by an exploration of the possibilities of expanding the 
categories of stakeholders to others who might be consulted—law students, 
legal professionals, legal system offcials, and NGOs. Finally, it addresses 
the subject specifc barriers to the inclusion of women’s rights in the law 
curriculum that each category of stakeholder may raise. 
Law faculty members, the obvious main actors in legal education reform,
may not be inclined to involve themselves for a variety of reasons. Regardless
of rank, law faculty tend to be woefully underpaid,265 have heavy teaching 
loads, and often supplement their income by teaching at private law facul-
ties, tutoring private students for state law faculty entrance exams,266 or work 
in legal practice as barristers, legal advisers, or judges. Arguably, such time 
consuming work in legal practice could help create connections between 
theory and practice in the curriculum and enrich teaching; it is not clear 
that such connections have been created. Rather, faculty may have limited 
time and energy to become involved in labor-intensive law reform projects. 
Different generational cohorts of legal academics may display different 
levels of responsiveness to legal education reform that encompasses the 
development of new conceptual frameworks, subjects, and pedagogies, as 
263. See Berbec-Rostas et al., supra note 245, at 55. See also Maria Slazak, Legal Education 
and Training in Poland, 4 EUR. J. LEGAL ED. 217–20 (2007), for a discussion of the lack of 
preparedness of students entering the legal profession. In some countries, legal studies 
are not suffcient for practicing law. After graduation from a law faculty, individuals 
must be hired as helpers to practicing attorneys before they are allowed to sit for the 
bar exam. 
264. But see the development of legal clinics in law faculties in Poland: THE LEGAL CLINIC: THE
IDEA, ORGANIZATION, METHODOLOGY (Dariusz Łomowski ed., 2005), available at http://www. 
fupp.org.pl/down/legal_clinic.pdf. 
265. Smolentseva, supra note 228, at 410–11. 
266. In Poland, part-time employment is more common than full-time employment in the 
higher education private sector. Berbec-Rostas et al., supra note 245, at 63–64. 






well as institutional reorganization. Two decades after the collapse of social-
ism, there has not yet been a full generational turnover in academic or legal 
system personnel—meaning that most professors, academic administrators, 
and legal system offcials were educated and began their careers in social-
ist times or in the immediate post-socialist years when the penumbra of 
socialist-style education still loomed large.267 These senior colleagues may 
be less open to proposals that substantively challenge their often entrenched 
professional beliefs, practices, and expertise. 
Young faculty, many of whom have done part or all of their graduate 
legal studies (LL.M. or Ph.D.) outside their own country268 and, in all likeli-
hood, speak and write one or more foreign languages other than Russian, 
are sources of new knowledge and pedagogies and are therefore ideal con-
tributors to a legal education reform process. However, as apprentices in the 
academy, often waiting for older professors to retire or die, young faculty is 
also the most vulnerable cohort in the law faculty hierarchy. Powerful senior 
colleagues may not appreciate young faculty’s innovativeness and creativity. 
Moreover, young faculty is also likely to be burdened with heavy teaching 
loads; in some instances, they may be teaching new subjects for which they 
also may be writing the frst textbooks in the national language. 
Although law curriculum reform is generally understood to be the turf of 
faculty as experts, there are other possible contributors who could provide 
different perspectives that might expand substantive and pedagogical reform 
options, although the inclusion of such individuals might require a paradigm 
shift in the region’s legal academic culture. 
As part of the academic community and as future professionals, law 
students are stakeholders in the legal education reform process. At the time 
of this writing, law students are part of the frst generation born after the col-
lapse of socialism; they bring a different generationally based perspective to 
their education. At a minimum, their input can be encouraged by a system 
of student evaluations of faculty and courses,269 as well as possible follow-
267. Since 1989 in Bulgaria, “academicians who gained their privileges under the Party quickly
abandoned Marxist doctrine but not their positions of power . . . they feared serious 
reform would leave them behind.” Petrova, supra note 67, at 70. There is more than a 
hint of irony in the prospect that law professors with outdated knowledge, who are not 
part of the ongoing law reform process and are out of touch with new legal thinking 
and, thus, not able to enter international academic relations, would “hold power in the 
learning structure” and be protected by “new regulations securing academic freedom.” 
Blomquist, supra note 256, at 89. 
268. Two examples are the EU Daphne Initiative and the Open Society Institute (OSI) Higher 
Education Support Program (HESP), which send younger legal scholars to Western Eu-
ropean or U.S. law faculties for doctoral work. 
269. See Izabela Kraśnicka, Polish Legal Education in the Light of the Recent Higher Educa-
tion Reform, 2012 MICH. ST. L.REV. 691, 709 (2012), for a discussion of the inclusion of 
student evaluations in the evaluation of faculty teaching every two years in Poland. 




up interviews with recent graduates working in the state apparatus, private 
practice, or social justice NGOs. That said, students spend a relatively brief 
period of time (three to fve years) studying at a law faculty. Students’ critical 
abilities can be discounted or challenged by those who believe either that 
younger persons ought to display deference toward their elders, especially 
those in offcial positions of formal authority, or that they are unseasoned 
and, thus, unqualifed to make such evaluations. 
Lawyers and legal system offcials also have a stake in the modernization
of legal education. They are concerned about the educational preparation of 
their future employees and colleagues. That said, given the relatively recent 
introduction of the norm of academic freedom in university governance and 
curriculum development, the extent of their involvement in legal education 
reform can become a delicate issue; their role would have to be clearly 
defned. 
NGOs working in public interest are yet another identifable category 
of possible stakeholders in the reform of legal education. A number of 
NGOs have legal staff with broad ranging expertise in environmental, labor, 
disability, prison, women’s, and sexual orientation rights. That said, highly 
credentialed academics may dismiss non-academic legal professionals in 
NGOs as lesser colleagues or even trespassers on sacred academic turf. 
Clearly, these more general considerations regarding the possible scope 
of consultation in curriculum reform efforts are relevant to the specifc issue 
of the inclusion of women’s rights in the law curriculum. Even if the range 
of stakeholders is expanded, there might also be subject-specifc obstacles 
to its inclusion. 
As Section II(B) points out, the subject evokes historical associations with
a repudiated past and its accompanying liabilities. Legal academics, who 
are supporters of contemporary backlash trinity forces or of neo-liberalism, 
may minimize the importance of the subject, argue against its inclusion, 
or dismiss it. As Section III(B) details, to the extent women’s rights raises 
the reform stakes in the curriculum by its openly critical recognition of the 
law/culture nexus, it offers coherent, far-reaching, destabilizing challenges 
to post-socialist fraternal patriarchies that claim to be liberal democracies 
bound by European human rights norms replicated in law faculties. Older 
faculty may be less welcoming of new, nontraditional subjects—especially 
if the subject challenges their reliance on hard legal positivism or has the 
potential to divert students away from the subjects they teach.270 Some fac-
ulty are likely to marginalize the importance of women’s rights, especially 
those who are unfamiliar with the signifcant contributions women’s rights 
270. In a private communication to the author, Janka Debreceniova, a Slovak lawyer special-
izing in women’s rights, makes this argument. 
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scholars have made to many legal issues, or who are unaware of the feld’s 
well-developed intellectual pedigree271 and intellectually vibrant, creative, 
and expansive contributions to the human rights canon, and to the recon-
ceptualization of the role and rule of law. 
In most countries, the absence of national language textbooks on women’s
rights272 and the limited number of scholarly articles on its many concerns 
can further marginalize the subject. This article characterizes such a situation
as a negative cycle of diminishing signifcance. By way of explanation, there 
may be little incentive for faculty to develop a textbook or write scholarly 
articles on a subject that is considered to be controversial or less valued 
by the higher echelons of each law faculty and that is, thus, less likely to 
be taught. In turn, the absence of texts or important scholarly works in the 
national language becomes an acceptable reason for continuing to assign a 
low priority to the inclusion of a subject in the curriculum. That low priority, 
then, is a further disincentive to undertaking scholarly work in the feld.273 
To the extent that female faculty are more likely to be drawn to the 
subject and advocate for it, there is reason to believe that the chances of 
its inclusion may be diminished. In law faculty hierarchies, women are less 
likely than men to be high ranking and infuential full professors or chairs 
of cathedras; women who are identifed as feminists risk being even more 
marginalized by their colleagues. 
That said, in a very limited number of law faculties in the region, there 
are small numbers of courageous law faculty members who are committed 
to including women’s rights in their teaching. They display laudable intel-
lectual fortitude by bringing the contributions of feminist legal theory to 
the legal academy, but at present, it does not appear that a supportive dean 
and/or a critical mass of informed colleagues, prepared to engage in the 
systemic reform that feminist legal theory calls for, exist in the overwhelming 
preponderance of law faculties in the region. 
As other possible stakeholders, lawyers and legal system offcials also 
may not support the inclusion of women’s rights in the curriculum. They 
share a basic intellectual socialization having been trained in more tradi-
tional positivist-oriented legal educational environments; in all likelihood, 
they have little knowledge of the subject274 and may rely on stereotypes as 
271. Publishers’ lists, admittedly mostly in Western Europe, North America, Australia, and 
India, offer new texts and a plethora of books (both scholarly and popular); journal 
articles abound; voluminous well-researched reports are generated by international and 
regional governmental organizations charged with a human rights mandate, as well as 
by national or international coalitions of NGOs. See Conaghan, supra note 224, at 352. 
272. Dr. Ivana Radačić, a Croatian legal scholar, has written a reader in feminist legal theory 
used in Croatia and Serbia. (Personal communication with the author.) 
273. In a private communication to the author, Dr. Radačić also notes the extremely limited 
amount of feminist legal theorizing by scholars in the region. 
274. See Magda Krzyżanowska-Mierzewska, The Reception Process in Poland and Slovakia, 
in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 531 (Helen Keller 
& Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008), for a discussion of the impact of the ECHR in Poland 
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evidence to justify its marginalization or relegation to culture and, thus, 
designation as falling outside the purview of law. Consequently, though the 
legal system presumably stands to beneft from better trained future lawyers 
and offcials, incumbents may have little incentive to actively support more 
extensive education in women’s rights. Moreover, if legal system offcials 
perceive that its inclusion will lead to an increase in caseloads which, in 
the region’s underfunded and strained legal systems, can be understood as 
a mere diversion of precious, limited institutional resources rather than an 
essential component of a democratic legal system, they may be unsupportive.
Finally, though some lawyers might fnd the prospect of a new feld such 
as women’s rights, spanning both private practice and public interest law, 
attractive, the harsh reality is that likely clients will have limited, if any, 
fnancial resources to fund litigation. 
3. Curriculum Options for Women’s Rights 
There are numerous options for the substantive inclusion of women’s rights 
in the post-socialist law curriculum. In the best of all worlds, these options 
are not mutually exclusive, and all of them would be available to students 
during the course of their legal studies. 
The most immediately obvious options exist in the human rights or 
international/regional law department or cathedra of the faculty. A women’s 
human rights course or seminar275 exposes students to the work of legal 
scholars, lawyers, and judges from different countries276 in a wide variety 
of fora.277 The range of possible topics is enormous: gender-based violence 
ranging from intimate relationships to traffcking; war and post-confict 
situations; regulation of reproduction, marriage, family life, and sexuality; 
and discrimination in employment, property law, criminal law, prisons, 
housing, social insurance, political life, education, economic development, 
children’s rights, migration, and dress codes. Seminars provide opportunities 
for intensive and extensive discussions, role-plays, supplementary flms, and 
external speakers (either live or via electronic hookup) or group projects as 
well as individual research. 
Here, a cautionary word regarding the selection of syllabus topics is 
warranted. One must be mindful not to focus largely on “exotic” violations 
and Slovakia; See Angelika Nuβberger, The Reception Process in Russia and Ukraine,
id. at 603, for a discussion of the impact of the ECHR in Russia and Ukraine. 
275. See Blackmore, supra note 119, at 261. 
276. Allaine Cerwonka, Traveling Feminist Thought: Difference and Transculturation in Central
and Eastern European Feminism, 33 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 809 (2008) (discuss-
ing the ethnographic concept of transculturation—the ways in which ideas enter societ-
ies, the circumstances under which they circulate, and how they have been creatively 
transformed—applied to feminist East-West contact and relationships). 
277. I am indebted to Ms. Dubravka Simonovic, the former representative from Croatia to 
the CEDAW Committee, for this contribution. 





      
 
  






of women’s rights, such as female genital cutting, honor killing, and dowry 
deaths, associated with a distant “other”–meaning non-European/non-White 
women in European or non-European societies. Usually, it produces a ra-
cialized double othering—meaning that women become other in societies 
already considered as other278 from a Western perspective. That othering 
can distract attention and analysis, thereby downplaying women’s rights 
violations in one’s own “modern” state. 
An alternative is a course or seminar on Contemporary Issues in Anti-
Discrimination Law. Its obvious focus—law bolstered discrimination against 
women and men based on sex and gender as well as other intersectional 
factors such as ethnic or racial minority, disability, sexual orientation, or 
immigrant/refugee status, and the remedies available to address these viola-
tions—can provide students with opportunities to explore cutting edge sex/ 
gender human rights issues. 
Substantive curriculum reform efforts anchoring women’s rights in the 
law curriculum cannot, however, be limited to specifc women’s rights or 
anti-discrimination offerings. The scholarly work of feminist legal theorists, 
in combination with the careful presentation of legal arguments by women’s 
rights litigators in domestic, regional, and international fora, provide con-
vincing evidence for the proposition that law reproduces, regulates, and 
enforces sex/gender systems that discriminate against or subordinate women 
in a variety of settings. It follows from this recognition and understanding 
that the content of a wide range of conventional/traditional courses279—juris-
prudence, constitutional law, labor law, criminal law, social insurance law, 
family law, and health law, as well as newer arrivals such as national security,
immigration, and environmental law—must be reviewed and appropriately 
revised to include gender. This process is known as gender mainstreaming.280
It challenges existing knowledge that is taken for granted281 and normalizes 
278. Historian Gerda Lerner, commenting on the connectedness of “difference” turning into 
“dominance,” notes that “[b]y looking at how the other is created, why it is created, 
and what function this creation serves, we gain insight into the actual workings of state 
societies. . . . [This] creation . . . is an essential aspect of hierarchical states, which 
depend on it to form their identity, to cohere, and to keep their system of dominance 
intact.” GERDA LERNER, LIVING WITH HISTORY / MAKING SOCIAL CHANGE 115 (2009). This insight 
clearly can be applied to the international system as well. 
279. In 1999, for example, Sweden made it compulsory to include gender-related knowledge 
in legal education. See Eva-Maria Svensson, Boundary-Work in Legal Scholarship, in
EXPLOITING THE LIMITS OF LAW, supra note 221 at 17, 33. 
280. Gender mainstreaming appears throughout the Beijing Platform for Action in critical 
areas of concern: education, health, victims of violence, armed confict, the economy, 
decision making, and human rights. An analysis of the effects of policies on women 
and men has an apparent concreteness and offers clear, relatively measurable direction 
to international policy makers. Charlesworth, supra note 178, at 3. 
281. Id. at 77–78. See Helen Ward, “The Adequacy of their Attention”: Gender-Bias and the 
Incorporation of Feminist Perspectives in the Australian Introductory Law Subject, 11 
LEGAL EDUC. REV. 1 (2000), for an extended discussion of the treatment of women in the 
Introductory subject (basic overview of the legal system including legal and constitutional
history, legal reasoning, dispute resolution, and professional legal issues) in Australian 
law schools. 




   
 
  





   
sex/gender issues as essential considerations. It underscores the need for 
critical examination of the extent to which gender stereotyping for women 
and men constructs legal identities. It uncovers and deinstitutionalizes282 
laws that support a state’s fraternal patriarchal order as it encourages the 
interrogation of domestic laws in a particular subject for state compliance 
with its regional and international sex/gender human rights obligations. 
Of course, mainstreaming women’s rights is also an appropriate strat-
egy in a more general international or regional human rights course. In an 
International Human Rights course, women’s rights should not be limited 
to a lecture on the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). Rather, the status and treatment of women should
be discussed as part of an understanding of each international human rights 
instrument. In a European Human Rights or a European Union law course, 
mainstreaming women’s rights would expose students to increasingly expan-
sive regional sex/gender equality jurisprudence in the decisions of the Court 
of Human Rights at Strasbourg283 and, to a lesser extent, in the European 
Court of Justice in Luxembourg. 
However, gender mainstreaming does have pitfalls284 that must be ad-
dressed. If it “does not capture the relational nature of gender, the role 
of power relations, [and] the way that structures of subordination are re-
produced,”285 it can obscure the way gender shapes our understanding of 
the world. In other words, if mainstreaming leaves male gender identities 
unexamined in domestic, regional, or international law courses, it permits 
them to be considered natural and immutable.286 In addition, if gender 
mainstreaming fails to include issues of intersectionality—including, but not 
limited to, race, ethnicity, class, age, disability, and sexual orientation287—in-
282. Shirin Rai, Conclusions: Looking Forward, in MAINSTREAMING GENDER, supra note 51, at 
271. 
283. With the entry into force of Protocol No. 12 of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (establishing a free-standing non-
discrimination guarantee and, thereby, expanding signifcantly the protection afforded 
by Article 14 which prohibits discrimination only in the enjoyment of other Convention 
rights), there are new opportunities to bring sex discrimination cases to the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Protocol 12 to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 Nov. 
2000, Eur. T.S. 177, (2005) (entered into force 1 April 2005). 
284. Sari Kouvo, The United Nations and Gender Mainstreaming: Limits and Possibilities, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 237 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 
2005). 
285. Charlesworth, supra note 178, at 18. 
286. For a discussion of mainstreaming and gender analysis defecting attention away from 
women and issues of power central to women’s subordination, see Sally Baden & Anne 
Marie Goetz, Who Needs [Sex] When You Can Have [Gender]? Conficting Discourses 
on Gender at Beijing, 56 FEMINIST REV. 3 (1997). 
287. See, e.g., Fiona Williams, Contesting “Race” and Gender in the European Union: A 
Multilayered Recognition Struggle for Voice and Visibility, in RECOGNITION STRUGGLES, supra
note 12, at 299. 













volved in producing sex/gender discrimination and subordination, its analysis
is incomplete, inadequate, and inconsistent with the inclusionary thrust of 
feminist legal theory and practice. 
Legal clinics, a new approach to legal education in the region, provide 
another opportunity for the inclusion of women’s rights in the curriculum. 
Clinicians around the world share goals of increased access to justice for 
previously unrepresented groups and to the development of public interest 
legal issues; they also are committed to a system of legal education that 
ensures future lawyers have the knowledge, skills, and values needed to 
help solve the world’s complex problems.288 
Clinical legal education is an attractive antidote to the largely passive 
nature of the prevailing traditional approach to legal education, which–as 
Section IV(B)(1) details– emphasizes formal legal theory and the memoriza-
tion of codes. Clinics provide opportunities for students to learn about case 
development in a problem-solving environment, to practice legal skills, 
and to address issues of professional responsibility by “allowing students to 
‘complement classroom material with experiential learning’ through contact 
with real clients; and . . . [by] provid[ing] legal services to poor and under-
represented people.”289 Clinics teach students to develop critical perspectives
on legal systems and public policies that may have a ripple effect—meaning 
that students trained to work on live cases in underserved populations can 
increase the number of committed practicing social justice-oriented lawyers 
upon completion of their education and their meeting of other professional 
requirements. 
Women’s rights can be integrated into the broader mandate of a public 
interest law clinic, or they can be addressed in a subject-specifc clinic. The 
latter avoids the possibility that women’s issues may be given a lower priority
or bypassed in clinics with a more general public interest focus. In either 
instance, however, the clinic needs students who are intellectually prepared 
with foundational knowledge from courses or seminars on the subjects they 
will be addressing in their clinic cases or other activities. 
The development and maintenance of a clinic290 is a complex profes-
sional task. It requires a low faculty-student ratio to provide quality clini-
cal training.291 Qualifed clinic supervisors with appropriate legal practice 
experience may be diffcult to fnd.292 In a clinic with actual clients, faculty 
288. Margaret (Peggy) Maisel, Setting an Agenda for the Global Clinical Movement, in THE
GLOBAL CLINICAL MOVEMENT, supra note 245, at 335–36. 
289. Mart Skrodzka et al., The Next Step Forward: The Development of Clinical Legal Educa-
tion in Poland Through a Clinical Pilot Program in Bialystok, 2 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 56, 
59 (2008). 
290. See Rekosh, supra note 74, at 86–89, for a discussion of the diffculties attendant upon 
efforts to “export” legal clinics and clinical legal education to Central and Eastern Europe,
and to incorporate them into the curriculum. 
291. Dietrich & Mansfeld, supra note 252, at 7. 
292. See Skrodzka et al., supra note 289, at 60, for a discussion of shortcomings of clinical 
legal education in Poland. 





members must be available for clients as they would be in a law offce. The 
clinic supervisor’s workload may be even more labor intensive293 because 
law students in the region are undergraduates and, in many instances, are 
likely to have limited life experience to bring to their work when they en-
gage with clients. 
Internships for supervised work, especially with a women’s rights NGO, 
for a longer duration than the brief internship opportunity that law facul-
ties in the region usually offer, are another curriculum option. Like clinics, 
internships can help ground students’ understanding of the complexities of 
legal practice in concrete experience. 
Law pedagogy is clearly a formative force in law students’ understand-
ing of the role of law and their future approaches to legal practice. If legal 
studies retain their traditional learning hierarchical format—meaning that 
knowledge is transferred as truth and certainty to passive recipients—students
are likely to reproduce that hierarchy when they become lawyers or legal 
system offcials.294 Consequently, there is a strong argument to be made that 
as curriculum is reformed, so should the prevailing pedagogy as institutional 
practice in the legal academy. 
Here, too, the feld of women’s rights has a contribution to make. Existing
ex-cathedra pedagogy (discussed in Section IV(B)(1)) sends clear cultural, 
legal, and political messages to students that the skills associated with criti-
cal inquiry are not an important part of their education. This devaluation is 
antithetical to the values and methods in women’s rights jurisprudence and 
legal practice that, through critical inquiry, identifes many forms of sex/ 
gender based domination, subordination, inequality, and marginalization 
upheld in law and pays attention to voices that have hitherto been silenced 
or ignored. While a more expansive review of contemporary hierarchy-
reducing pedagogies for law faculties is beyond the scope of this article, 
no discussion of legal academy educational reform is complete without 
rethinking that pedagogy is a part of curriculum reform. 
V. CONCLUSION 
“Why are women’s rights absent or marginalized in post-socialist legal 
education?” I answer my question by analyzing the processes of legitima-
tion and delegitimation of women’s rights in culture, politics, law, and legal 
institutions in the region. I argue that these spheres are connected to, and 
have an impact on, legal education and, more specifcally, the contents of 
the law school curriculum and its pedagogy. 
293. Id. at 67–68. In Poland, the clinic only provides written legal opinions. Clients are never 
represented in court. 
294. Otto, supra note 260, at 40. 






   
   
  





Unlike other subjects, such as commercial, criminal, administrative, or 
constitutional law, whose legitimacy for the modern state is not contested per
se, women’s rights pose deep and destabilizing challenges to the law, culture,
and politics of existing post-socialist fraternal patriarchal systems claiming to
be liberal democracies. The women’s rights canon asks how gender works in 
law and how law works to produce gender.295 In so doing, it identifes law 
as a “gendering strategy,”296 helping to maintain social control. It exposes 
the maintenance of that control as resting, at least in part, on silencing or 
ignoring or victim blaming analyses and stereotypes.297 It fully disputes the 
claim that women’s rights concerns are not legal issues and should thus be 
relegated to the realm of culture outside critical legal scrutiny. 
At the time of this writing, the number of law faculties in the region 
offering a basic course in human rights or a European human rights course 
has increased from the nineties. Perhaps one or two class sessions are de-
voted to women’s rights. In subjects where explicit mentioning of women is 
unavoidable—family law and criminal law, for example—the contributions 
of women’s rights jurisprudence to crucial issues in these subjects are likely 
ignored or dismissed. Very few law faculties have developed women’s rights 
courses, seminars, or clinics, and to the best of my knowledge, none have 
paid serious attention to the intellectually challenging curriculum reform 
issue of gender mainstreaming, which recognizes the sex/gender impacts 
of law on both women and men and the power relationships that law and 
the legal practice construct and uphold. More likely, despite the passage 
of almost two and a half decades, the subject still is taught in externally 
funded trainings and seminars298 open to lawyers or legal system offcials, 
but not to students. By no means do I dispute the need for such continuing 
professional education. I suggest, however, that given the passage of time 
and the ongoing failure of law faculties, considered as part of the legal sys-
tem elite, to remedy the curriculum defciencies generated by the absence 
of women’s rights as an informing principle, as well as a substantive area 
of law, one might conclude that law faculties prefer to shift the intellectual 
burden by derailing its academic institutional recognition. 
Clearly, the inclusion of women’s rights in the law curriculum is not 
a panacea. It is not a substitute for political will on the part of the state to 
actually implement and enforce its women’s rights obligations. Nor should it 
295. Gender resists visibility and critique due to its pervasiveness and our personal investments.
V. Spike Peterson, Whose Crisis? Early and Post-Modern Masculinism, in INNOVATION AND
TRANSFORMATION IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 185 (Stephen Gill & James Mittelman eds., 1997). 
296. Carol Smart, The Woman of Legal Discourse, 1 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 29, 30 (1992). 
297. See RIKKI HOLTMAAT & JONNEKE NABER, WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND CULTURE, FROM DEADLOCK TO DIALOGUE
(2011), for a discussion of stereotyping. 
298. The most extensive and vigorous one, the Women’s Human Rights Training Institute 
(WHRTI) in Sofa, teaches feminist legal theory and relevant legal skills for bringing cases
in domestic, regional, and international fora. It has trained more than eighty lawyers in 
the region.








   
 
 
displace broad NGO consciousness raising campaigns and projects breaking
the silence that envelops controversial issues. 
That said, however, if one considers the legal academy as a forum for 
communication and dialogue, a site of a powerful socialization process for 
future legal professionals imbuing them with a commitment to a democratic,
inclusionary rule of law, and a potential contributor to the legitimation of 
law and the legal systems at regime and output levels, then the almost com-
plete absence of women’s rights in the curriculum is deeply troubling and 
inconsistent with its mission to prepare lawyers and legal system personnel 
for their work in the twenty-frst century. It is concrete evidence for the claim 
that law still is male-oriented in its references and its basic assumptions and 
is a de facto endorsement of different valuations299 of women’s and men’s 
status and lived experience as legal subjects. It constitutes acknowledgement
that legal education naturalizes a range of discriminatory harms identifed 
in regional and international human rights canons and contributes to the 
compromised quality of citizenship for women.300 To the extent that legal 
education actively supports or passively encourages the relegation of women’s
rights to the realm of culture instead of acknowledging it as a major con-
cern of democracy and a rule of law, it serves the agenda of contemporary 
fraternal patriarchy in its neoliberal or backlash trinity iterations. 
APPENDIX A 
Survey Results 
The surveys were conducted in May 2008 (end of the second cycle), 
November 2009 (beginning of the third cycle), and November 2011 (be-
ginning of the fourth cycle) among participants in the Women’s Human 
Rights Training Institute (WHRTI).301 Eight questions with sub-sections were 
299. “[G]ender equality cannot be equated with the right to work . . . [and] individual freedom
[cannot] be suffcient when women and men’s contributions are not similarly valued to 
begin with.” Eisenstein, Eastern European Male Democracies, supra note 62, at 305. 
300. Defned by law, citizenship “plays a role in the construction of gender differences as 
well as boundaries that are then created between individuals (and) the ways in which 
the state ascribes certain duties to women and men through cultural, economic and 
political means . . . and, generally speaking, on women’s positions and gender relations 
within a particular society.” Magyari-Vincze, supra note 24. See also RIAN VOET, FEMINISM
AND CITIZENSHIP (1998); Zdravomyslova & Temkina, supra note 59, at 97. 
301. The Institute, whose headquarters are in Sofa, Bulgaria, provides at least some of the 
legal education in women’s rights lacking in the law faculty curriculum in the region. It 
trains Eastern European lawyers to develop and argue women’s rights cases in domestic, 
regional, and international fora. It was founded in 2005 by an NGO partnership consist-
ing of the Bulgarian Gender Research Foundation in Sofa, the Network of East-West 
Women in Gdansk, and the Center for Reproductive Rights in New York, and is funded 
by the Open Society Institute and other foundations. 
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asked; frst, whether a human rights course was offered in their law faculty, 
whether they enrolled, whether women’s rights were discussed, and how 
many classes were devoted to the subject. Then, the same sequence was 
asked for a European Human Rights course (added in the third survey) and 
a women’s rights seminar. Next, whether women’s rights were raised in 
other law faculty courses, and if so, which ones. What aspects of women’s 
rights were covered and how much time. The last series of questions asked 
whether they had experienced sexist attitudes in their legal education and, 
if so, an elaboration. How much time was devoted to women’s rights issues 
in those courses? 
In 2008, sixteen lawyers (from Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Georgia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and 
Turkey) participated in the survey. All but one were female. All but one 
studied law between 2000 and 2007. 
Respondents from twelve of the thirteen countries stated that there was 
an elective human rights course at their law faculty consisting of formal lec-
tures on legal texts with virtually no discussion. Less than one third recalled 
that, at best, one lecture was devoted to women’s human rights consisting 
of a cursory formal review of the provisions of the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Eight respondents 
noted that women’s rights were briefy mentioned in at least one law school 
subject (four in family law; two in labor law; and two in an EU law course). 
All others stated that there was no discussion of women’s rights in any law 
courses. One respondent reported that a women’s rights course was avail-
able to LL.M. students and that her faculty’s public interest law clinic, in 
principle, could handle women’s rights cases, but that she did not remember 
any such cases. Eight respondents discussed the question about faculty and 
student attitudes toward women’s rights. They recalled a dismissive attitude 
in some classes on the part of faculty and students toward women - however 
large their numbers in the lecture hall. Several considered the law faculty 
environment an intellectually unsafe one for raising women’s rights legal 
issues. Six interviewees volunteered crude jokes about women by male 
law faculty in lectures. Each of the eight recalled feeling embarrassed and 
awkward when their classmates responded with laughter; several reported 
being angry, though they acknowledged that they did not dare challenge 
the professor or argue with their peers. 
In 2009, for the third round of the Institute, twenty-two lawyers (from 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uz-
bekistan and observers from Ireland and Spain) participated. All but two were
female. Nine studied law during the late 1990s; thirteen studied law after 
2000. Eleven respondents reported that there was a course on international 
human rights in their law faculty; fourteen stated that there was no course. 
Only two of the eleven reported that women’s rights were discussed; one of 
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the two noted that CEDAW was only mentioned in passing. Six respondents 
stated that a separate course on European Human Rights was offered; one 
reported that this subject was added after she fnished law school. Two of the 
six reported that women’s rights were mentioned very briefy; one reported 
that since she was teaching the course, more time was devoted to women’s 
right issues. All respondents reported that there was no women’s rights course
or seminar during their law studies. Eight respondents noted that women 
were briefy mentioned in at least one law school subject (family law (8); 
criminal law or labor law (4); constitutional law (3); international public law 
(1), and international humanitarian law (1)). Six interviewees responded to 
the question on faculty and student attitudes toward women’s rights, noting 
that they felt uncomfortable raising women’s rights issues. One reported that 
she and her classmates were not aware of the subject; another commented 
that there was no opportunity to discuss the issue; another stated that there 
was no qualifed professor; yet another remarked that no one would listen 
or know the answers. One respondent was told to “stop her feminist tricks.” 
In 2011, twenty-four lawyers from Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia,
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, 
and an observer from Spain participated in the Institute. All but three are 
female. The majority (13) had their legal education since 2000; four had 
their legal education “on the cusp” (spanning time late nineties and early 
twenty-frst century); fve had their legal education in the mid to late nineties. 
Eight respondents stated that a Human Rights course or seminar was 
offered in their faculties; one reported that it was offered as an option but 
not enough students signed up. Another reported that human rights were 
briefy discussed in the international and constitutional law classes. Six of 
the eight took a Human Rights course. Only two respondents indicated 
that women’s rights were discussed at all—and, then very briefy. Eight 
respondents indicated that a European Human Rights course was offered; 
six took the class. Only one respondent indicated that women’s rights 
were discussed at all and, then, only “partially.” Two respondents from the 
same law faculty stated that a women’s rights seminar was offered; one of 
them took the seminar. Another took a seminar on Islam and Law in which 
women’s rights were discussed. The majority of respondents (12) stated that 
women’s rights were not discussed in any other law school courses; those 
who reported, that there were discussions and specifed the subject—fam-
ily law (4), labor law—pregnant workers (2), and criminal law (2)—stated 
that, at most, two hours or one class was devoted to the subject, except for 
one respondent who stated that because the professor is a feminist, twenty 
percent of the criminal classes included women’s rights. Eight respondents 
reported sexist attitudes from faculty or students regarding rape (2), abortion 
(1), and election quotas (1). Three reported faculty comments that women 
are less intelligent or are not as good as male lawyers, and one reported 
incidents of sexual harassment. 
